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Co-Presidents' Column 
Paula C. Johnson, Syracuse University College of Law, and 
Michael Rooke-Ley, Seattle University School of Law (visiting 2003-04) 
Greetings, once again, from your bi-coastal co-
presidents-Michael in Eugene, Oregon, and 
Paula in Syracuse, New York. As we write to you 
during these first days of August, we find 
ourselves reflecting on SALT's accomplishments 
with considerable pride. Yet, as we look ahead, we 
feel as if we can ill-afford a moment's rest. 
All of us are gratified-and enonnously 
relieved-by the Supreme Court's decision in Grutter v. Bollinger. There is, of course, no 
issue more central to the work of SALT than affinnative action in law school admissions. In 
1976, SALT filed an amicus brief in Bakke, and, a generation later in 2003, an amicus brief 
in Grutter. In addition, so many of you, as SALT members, spoke out in various ways through 
the media, building momentum as oral arguments drew near. Our half-page ad in The 
Washington Post was widely-read and well-received, and SALT's press conference and partici-
pation in the Washington, D.C., rally on April 1st demonstrated, once again, SALT's commit-
ment to activism beyond the ivory tower. (See commentary on the Grutterdecision starting 
onpage7.) 
We were also deeply heartened by the Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas. The teaching 
of-and living with-Bowers v. Hardwick, year after year sincel 986, has been a personally 
painful experience for us all, and Justice Kennedy's eloquence lifted a huge burden and 
provided an occasion for some celebration. As you are well aware, SALT signed on to an 
amicus brief in Lawrence, and SALT members, individually and as part of our committee, 
have been long-standing leaders in the struggles for equality and justice facing gay and 
lesbian communities. (See commentary on the Lawrence opinion starting on page 2.) 
These victories will be short-lived unless we remain vigilant. We know all too well, for 
instance, that the Bush Administration and its conservative supporters are seeking to avenge 
these "losses" through nominees to the federal bench, including, perhaps, the Supreme Court 
itself. Thus, the work of our Judicial Nominations committee, chaired by Bob Dinerstein 
(American University), is of dire importance. We urge you to join the committee or to offer 
your expertise on an ad hoc basis. (See news of the committee's work starting on page 25.) 
Further, having been provided a veritable blueprint by Justice Scalia in Grutter, anti-
affinnative action activists are planning the next assaults on diversity and fairness in higher 
education. Through our monitoring efforts, we must ensure that the Court's recognition of 
the importance of diversity and equal opportunity in higher education are achieved by our 
institutions. Presidents' Column continued on page 2 
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Presidents' Column: 
... continued ffrom page 1 
Similarly, the backlash against the 
Lawrence opinion and against gains 
toward greater societal inclusion by the 
LGBT community must be countered by 
coalition efforts that recognize the 
importance of equality and fairness for all 
persons, irrespective of sexuality. 
SALT's work continues on many other 
fronts, as well. First Monday, October 6th, 
is not far off, and we ask you to plan 
"[W]e find ourselves 
reflecting on SALT's 
accomplishments with 
considerable pride. 
Yet, as we look ahead, 
we feel as if we can 
ill-afford a moment's 
rest." 
public interest/social justice-oriented 
events on your campus. Feel free to contact 
our First Monday committee chair, Tayyab 
Mahmud (visiting at Seattle University), 
for assistance. Also, we are moving ahead 
with our diversity survey, as an alternative 
to the poisonous rankings in U.S. News & 
World Report; with our proposals for 
alternatives to conventional bar exams; 
with our critique of the law school 
admission process; and with our efforts to 
challenge the Solomon Amendment. 
The opportunity for us to work with 
the SALT membership remains enormously 
rewarding. As an all-volunteer organiza-
tion, our continuing effectiveness depends 
on your willingness to join a committee, 
offer fund-raising suggestions, or contrib-
ute financially. Remember: SALT is the 
progressive voice in legal education. Your 
active support ensures that we will be 
heard. 
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Court's opposite position in Bowers 
Te just seventeen years ago. Commentary on Lawrence v. exas Even in areas that are not doctri-
Putting Lawrence v. 
Texas to Work 
Marc R. Poirier, Seton Hall University 
School of Law 
Lawrence v. Texas is a wonderful and-to 
me-unexpected victory. It overturns the 
Texas same-sex only sodomy law, not on a 
narrow Equal Protection ground as some 
had predicted, but in a broad holding 
finding a constitutional privacy right to 
consensual sexual activity in intimate 
relations in private locations. By overrul-
ing Bowers v. Hardwick in the way it 
does, Lawrence removes a tremendous 
stigma from gays and lesbians throughout 
the country. Even though sodomy laws 
were rarely enforced, they were often 
invoked to brand gays and lesbians as 
potential criminals in contexts running 
from adoption to discrimination in 
employment. The amicus brief in 
Lawrence that SALT signed addressed just 
this issue of cultural shift as a basis for 
overturning Bowers. Lawrence affects the 
whole country, not just the thirteen states 
that still had sodomy laws, as a cultural 
marker of an ongoing change, an 
increasing acceptance of homosexuality as 
a normal variant of human sexual and 
affectional activity. 
Many legal, political and social 
victories over the past few years have 
brought us to this point. The larger 
instrument of change here is visibility. 
Decades of standing up to vicious stereo-
types and insisting on fair treatment-at 
first by a few courageous individuals, often 
at great personal sacrifice- has shifted 
cultural norms. A Supreme Court opinion 
acknowledging this change is extraordi-
narily important, especially given the 
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nally related, Lawrence is likely to 
serve as an agent of further change. 
Leading advocacy organizations like 
Lambda Legal Defense and Education 
Fund and the American Civil Liberties 
Union's Lesbian and Gay Rights Project 
have already promulgated post-Lawrence 
agendas, seeking to capitalize on its 
momentum. Lawrence is also triggering a 
vigorous reaction from the religious right. 
It sees Lawrence as a threat to traditional 
marriage and family structure, and 
another indication of the decline of 
morality in our society. Calls have gone 
out for a federal constitutional amend-
ment to "protect" opposite sex marriage, 
and for a renewed effort to overturn Roe v. 
Wade. The libertarian right, which 
opposed the Texas sodomy law on the 
general principle of limited government, 
now claims Lawrence as its own victory, a 
different position from that of the 
religious right, but one also out of 
alignment with progressive causes. 
The Lawrence decision on privacy is 
doctrinally limited in subtle but impor-
tant ways. The privacy right protected 
seems to involve sexual activity in a 
context of binary intimacy, primarily in 
the home. We could also identify these as 
"decisional," "relational," and "zonal" 
privacy interests, following the amicus 
brief filed on behalf of international 
human rights groups, with Mary Robinson 
as the lead plaintiff. One might question 
whether Lawrence is altogether clear 
about a constitutional right to casual sex 
(not intimate) or sex involving more than 
two people (not binary, perhaps not 
intimate), although it seems likely that 
Lawrence will be read to prohibit 
criminalizing adult consensual sexual 
activity that occurs within the walls of the 
home. 
Poirier continued on page 4 
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It Ain't Just About Sex 
Elvia Arriola, Northern Illinois University College of Law Commentary on Lawrence v. Texas 
Right after the Supreme Court decided on June 26, 2003, that my consensual sexual acts as 
a lesbian aren't the goverriment's business, I asked two friends what they thought of the 
amazing landmark decision in Lawrence v. Texas. One said, "I don't trust it. ... Someone 
will just come back with some way of getting at us through different means." Another said it 
was "wonderful . . . . It'll have a positive impact in other areas of gay people's lives." For 
those of us who have followed the direction of the law since the devastating blow in Bowers 
v. Hardwick, which rejected the notion of a fundamental right to homosexual sodomy, 
Lawrence comes full circle to the obviously right result. But maybe that result is one that 
the nation wasn't ready for in 1986, when Bowers was decided. I wonder, though, what 
makes us more ready now? Is it just the end product of a long campaign that had so many 
mixed results following Bowers-from the military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, to the 
recognition of marriage rights by Hawaii, to a backlash with the federal Defense of Marriage 
Act (DOMA), to a civil union law in Vermont but several mini-state DOMAs, to the ongoing 
struggle by universities to hang on to their federal funds when they try to keep the homopho-
bic military from interviewing their students? Is it a promise or something to deflect our 
attention away from more serious threats to our civil liberties (e.g., the PATRIOT Act) raised 
by the fallout of 9-11? 
At a time when the separation of church and state is being continually challenged, this 
decision affirms the right to say that the government can't tell me what to believe about 
what's moral or not in sex; it can't tell me whom to love or whom to marry; it must stay out 
of my bedroom unless what I'm doing isn't consensual and may injure someone who is a 
minor or who can't consent. Along with the affirmative action decision in Grutter v. 
Bollinger, these decisions tell me the work of the progressive is long, arduous, unpredictable. 
It gives me a little faith in the system just when I'm tired of grinding my teeth from the 
latest anti-terrorist measures being announced by the Department ofJustice. But I need to 
tell my friends that the distrust of one and the optimism of the other are both realistic. 
A Bottom Line Victory 
Pat Cain, University of Iowa College of Law 
Kennedy's decision in Lawrence explicitly 
overruled Bowers v. Hardwick. I view that 
as a major victory. While Kennedy was not 
clear about the exact content of the 
"liberty" interest at stake in the case (e.g., 
he does not call it a right to privacy), he 
was perlectly clear that criminal laws 
banning intimate sexual relationships 
between consenting adults in private are 
unconstitutional. That is the bottom line. 
This opinion is the final proof that those 
GLB rights activists who supported 
Kennedy's nomination so many years ago 
had the right instincts. 
SALT Equalizer 
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How Far We've Come 
Art Leonard, New York Law School 
I am particularly struck by the ironic 
justice of this historic opinion being 
written by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Jr., 
who was appointed to the seat vacated by 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., who cast the deciding 
vote against us in Bowers v. Hardwick 17 
years ago. That everybody involved with the 
case expected a victory-the only things in 
doubt being which theory the Court would 
use and how big the majority would be-
shows how far the lesbian and gay rights 
movement has come in the intervening 




Joan W. Howarth, Boyd School of Law, 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
My difficulty taking in Lawrence taught 
me something about the exclusionary 
power of law. Even as I read the breaking 
newswire story that Lawrence had 
overruled Bowers, I had no capacity to 
believe it. A few minutes later, even as I 
read Justice Kennedy's repudiation of 
Bowers and cried tears of relief, some very 
primitive instinct toward self-protection 
had my brain racing to consider every 
possible scenario in which this could be an 
elaborate hoax. This profound and 
irrational wariness surprised and unsettled 
me. I had taught Bowers countless times, 
assigned papers on "How Bowers changed 
my life," assigned Michael Hardwick's oral 
history, shown a Michael Hardwick video 
in class, and considered myself relentless in 
refusing to minimize the bigotry and pain 
of Bowers. But I did not understand how 
much Bowers had gotten to me, and how 
central it has been to my very personal 
understanding of law's exclusionary power, 
until I found myself unable to trust that it 
was really gone. Now I think about 
Mccleskey v. Kemp, which accommo-
dated systemic racism in the imposition of 
the death penalty. McCleskey and Bowers 
were both landmark 5-4 decisions in which 
Justice Powell provided the swing vote and 
then reportedly expressed doubts after 
leaving the bench. I wonder what it will 
take to overruleMcCleskey, and I under-
stand more deeply how powerful the 
repudiation of Mccleskey could be. 
August 2003 
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Commentary on Lawrence v. Texas 
police power authority to prohibit 
activities deemed to be harmful to the 
community or to individuals. The 
distinction between harm and mere 
moral opprobrium is not always 
Poirier: 
continued from page 2 
Lawrence does not answer clearly 
whether there is a right to sexual activity 
in places not quite so private, e.g., in a car, 
at a music festival, in the woods, on the 
beach, in a sex club (not physically as 
private as a home, not intimate, perhaps 
not binary). The idea of semi-private 
sexual activity has not achieved the same 
cultural acceptance as the intimate sex in 
the home protected by Lawrence, and 
probably makes most Americans uncom-
fortable. It is of concern nevertheless 
because most arrests of gay men for sexual 
activity are brought under public inde-
cency and lewd conduct statutes, and these 
arrests are likely to continue after 
Lawrence. Among the other issues 
unaddressed by Lawrence are the rights of 
transgendered/transsexual folk (no sexual 
activity, no intimacy, not limited to 
home). 
Justice Scalia's dissent, like the 
conservative positions it reflects, claims 
that if a state is not allowed to make laws 
based on its own moral determinations, 
then laws against bigamy, same-sex 
marriage, adult incest, prostitution, 
masturbation, adultery, fornication, 
bestiality, and obscenity will also fall. 
Elsewhere he adds child pornography to the 
list. Much of this is hot air. While 
masturbation and fornication among 
consenting adults in private are now 
probably constitutionally protected, the 
other categories may or may not be reached 
by Lawrence, for reasons varying from lack 
of intimacy (prostitution is commercial, 
therefore arguably not intimate) to 
governmental definition of a conferred 
status (bigamy laws protect marriage) to 
SALT Equalizer 
certain, though, and is sure to be the 
subject of future cases and law review 
articles. 
Doctrinally, it is interesting that 
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in 
Lawrence rejects a view of Due Process 
liberty rights as rooted in long tradition. 
''Lawrence [is] a 
cultural marker of an 
ongoing change, an 
increasing acceptance 
of homosexuality as a 
normal variant of 
human sexual and 
affectional activity. 
[But] SALT and its 
members need to keep 
their eyes on the 
political fallout ... " 
Instead he places emphasis on the 
traditions of the last fifty years. Bowers 
was wrong when decided, he writes, because 
it should have noted an emerging 
recognition that liberty includes protection 
for adults in deciding how to conduct their 
activities in their private lives concerning 
sex. The Grutter v. Bollinger majority 
also recognizes that affirmative action in 
some forms, while appropriate now, may 
not be appropriate in twenty-five more 
years. (See Grutter commentary on pages 
7-15.) Are we looking at a Court that is 
willing to be explicit about viewing 
fundamental constitutional issues 
through the lens of pragmatism and 
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evolution of social norms? Lawrence also 
uses human rights decisions from Europe 
to make its argument about cultural shift, 
an interesting development that is 
anathema to conservative members of the 
Court. Similarly, Justice Ginsburg's 
concurrence in Grutter leads off with a 
reference to international norms for 
affirmative action. The parallel in 
arguments is interesting, especially as 
reference to international practices or 
precedents is also anathema to some 
conservative members of the Court. 
The Lawrence decision does not 
address discrimination law directly, 
although as discussed above it does good 
work by showing that homosexuality has 
become more mainstream as a part of 
American culture in the last fifty years. On 
discrimination issues, we may see a 
somewhat ironic flip-flop on the status-
conduct argument. After Bowers and 
before Lawrence, GLB advocates in various 
contexts argued that even though same sex 
sexual activity could be criminalized per 
Bowers, just because an individual self-
identified as gay should not permit anyone 
to assume thats/he was actually engaging 
in or likely to engage in sexual activity. A 
distinction was thus drawn between status 
and conduct. After Lawrence, we may see a 
strategy that seeks to link homosexual 
status explicitly to sexual conduct. The 
argument would be that discriminating 
against GLB individuals is indirectly 
burdening a protected constitutional right 
to private sexual activity. Thus, GLB people 
may seek to be presumed to engage in 
sexual activity. Presumed conduct would 
protect openly gay status. 
The issue of gay men and lesbians in 
the military may or may not be affected by 
the Lawrence decision. As of this year, the 
tenth year of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" 
policy, more than 9000 GLBT 
servicemembers have been processed out of 
the military, according to Servicemembers 
Legal Defense Network, an advocacy group 
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that does work in this area. A case has 
already been filed relying on Lawrence to 
challenge the expulsion of a career 
servicemember on the basis of his homo-
sexuality. But there is a traditional judicial 
deference to military decisions, and 
national security may well serve as a trump 
argument at this particular moment in 
history. Again, visibility and cultural 
acceptance in other contexts will probably 
eventually erode military opposition to 
openly GLBT people in the military, but it 
may take another generation, until the 
career military personnel who were 
teenagers in the 1980s become command-
ing officers. 
Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring 
opinion in Lawrence based on Equal 
Protection doctrine. In her view, a state 
could prohibit sodomy if it wished, but 
there was no evident reason for Texas to 
prohibit sodomy between same sex couples 
and yet allow it between opposite sex 
couples. O'Connor's opinion holds that 
mere moral disapproval, like animus, is 
insufficient to satisfy rational basis review. 
She thus applies the "rational basis with 
bite" approach of Romer v. Evans. It is 
worth noting that the day after Lawrence 
came down, the Court granted certiorari 
and then vacated and remanded the 
decision in Limon v. Kansas, a case in 
which state law treated consensual sex 
between same sex teenagers much more 
harshly than between consenting opposite 
sex teenagers. The state court opinion in 
Limon cited Bowers, but the constitu-
tional challenge was an Equal Protection 
challenge. It is easy to read too much into a 
GVR order, but perhaps this is a signal that 
the lower courts must take seriously the 
Equal Protection argument not addressed 
by the majority in Lawrence. Equal 
Protection arguments are likely to be 
crucial for status issues like marriage/ 
domestic partnership/civil union, which 




The classic question is "What is to 
be done?" SALT joined one of the 
amicus briefs in Lawrence, and SALT's 
activity on judicial nominations has 
included opposition to candidates with 
Commentary on Lawrence v. Texas 
"We need to consider 
how SALT can best 
facilitate the often 
local activism for 
change that makes 
possible larger 
victories such as 
Lawrence." 
terrible records on GLBT issues. Generally 
speaking, though, SALT has typically 
focused its organizational energies on 
legal education and legal institutions. 
Much SALT work in the area of GLBT issues 
has addressed the enforcement of law 
school nondiscrimination policies in 
recruiting, specifically concerning on 
campus recruiting by the military. That is 
to say that SALT has focused on law school 
implementation of the AALS nondiscrimi-
nation policy and the challenges posed by 
the Solomon Amendment. Analysis of 
Lawrence and attention to the follow-up 
programs being developed in light of 
Lawrence should be part of any law 
school's GLBT presence, and could fit 
within the amelioration obligation. 
Within the specific confines of the law 
school, GLBT advocacy sometimes finds 
itself in some conflict with other civil 
rights work, and SALT would do well to 
explore how to address coalition work here. 
Although Solomon Amendment work 
is important, it sometimes has the feel of 
the tangential, a symbolic battle in which 
the military seeks to commandeer the 
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resources of law schools against their will. 
Litigation that challenges the Solomon 
Amendment seems likely, and will bring 
the First Amendment issues to the fore, 
making the issue seem far less tangential. 
And a reversal of the military's "Don't ask, 
don't tell" policy would make the whole 
issue moot. 
More broadly, SALT and its members 
need to keep their eyes on the political 
Poirier continued on page 6 
A Letter from Sylvia Law 
Following is the text of a letter sent by 
New York University School of Law 
Professor Sylvia A. Law to United States 
Supreme Court Associate justice Anthony 
Kennedy on July 1, 2003. 
Dear Justice Kennedy: 
Thank you for your magnificent 
decision and opinion in Lawrence v. 
Texas. 
Your contribution to the complex task 
of defining the liberty protected by the 
constitution is as sage and eloquent as any 
Supreme Court opinion since Justice 
Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman. 
Your elucidation of history and its role 
in constitutional decision making is 
informed and wise. 
Most important, your opinion reflects 
profound empathy and respect for human 
dignity. 
You will no doubt receive many critical 
letters. I hope not as many or as nasty as 
those directed to Justice Blackmun in 
response to Roe. But many of us are deeply 
grateful to you. 
Sincerely, 
Sylvia A. Law 
August 2003 
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Commentary on Lawrence v. Texas 
Arriola: 
continued from page 3 
When the one who said "wonderful" prefaced her commentary with her understanding of the 
outrageous facts that led to the appeal-the police barged into the home of two men engaged 
in sex whose neighbor had made a false 911 call-I briefly educated her on the reality that 
such incidents occur frequently in the homes and neighborhoods of those who are vulnerable 
to police abuse because of their class and race, a reality she doesn't have too think of often as 
a white lesbian. I'd have to agree with my distrusting friend that Lawrence is wonderful but 
"Is Lawrence a 
promise or something 
to deflect our 
attention away from 
more serious threats 
to our civil 
it's only an important step forward and it 
doesn't take care of potential backlashes nor 
does it guarantee against other people abusing 
the right of privacy in the name of anti-
terrorism or other conduct that isn't queer sex. 
If Lawrence is the Brown case for sexual 
minorities then there is much to applaud, but 
hard work must follow for the sexual minority 
community to feel it has won the campaign 
for its citizenship rights. 
l 'b ?" ib er ties.... We can hope thatl.awrencewill have a 
domino effect, but how and for whom? I think 
of how Lawrence is a coup for queer sex, but 
what does it really do for my friend who, as I write, is recovering from transsexual reconstruc-
tive surgery? She suffers mistreatment not necessarily because of her choice in love but just 
for being "too queer" as a transgender. Lawrence covers the issue of sex behind closed doors, 
but does it really handle the issue of identity-based discrimination, i.e., the impact of sheer 
prejudice? One would hope that is what Kennedy meant in stating that the penalty under the 
Texas law was minute, but the stigma is harsh. It's the impact of being labeled a deviant by 
one's society or being treated as a second class citizen just for being different from any 
dominant majority. O'Connor covered this issue to some extent in focusing on Texas' not 
having a problem with sodomy per se but only with gay sodomy which, she felt, made the 
statute illegal on equal protection grounds. 
Yet my mixed reactions aside, this is a satisfying result to those of us who have labored as 
scholars, lawyers and expert witnesses for years to challenge the unfair stereotypes that have 
led us to lose jobs, homes, child custody, and essential medical treatment. Kennedy's 
majority opinion rejected the logic of Bowers and its screaming homophobic opinions. 
Burger's opinion was stunning then as Scalia's dissent in Lawrence amazes one now. To him 
it's about a culture war. I don't think so. It's more than that. It's about those of us who 
fundamentally disagree with Scalia's view that this isn't about liberty rights, or that a life 
partner choice and the privacy of our bedroom fall into the same category of governmental 
concerns as making it illegal to work more than 60 hours in a bakery! Scalia may see this 
opinion as an ushering in of constitutional disorder. I welcome it as a necessary chaos to 
balance out recent government threats to the Bill of Rights. 
SALT Equalizer Page 6 
Poirier: 
continued from page 5 
fallout from Lawrence. The religious right 
will push for an ultraconservative Supreme 
Court appointment and a constitutional 
amendment around opposite sex marriage. 
Progressive law professors will need to work 
in coalition with reproductive rights 
groups as well as GLBT advocacy groups to 
counter these conservative demands. And of 
course, much work remains to be done on 
the GLBT front: marriage (or perhaps 
equivalents); adoption and custody; 
antidiscrimination work, including the 
military issue, which I see as especially 
important because it undermines the 
gender stereotyping of the military; 
transsexual/transgender issues; issues in 
schools, including curriculum, the 
presence of Gay/Straight clubs, and anti-
bullying policies. I would also include an 
expanded scope of privacy protection for 
some more stigmatized types of sexual 
activity. Much of this work is at the local 
or state level. Much of it is not even legal 
but is about addressing local practices and 
policies in private institutions like 
corporations, universities and churches. 
Visibility is, as ever, at the center of the 
process of change here. Both the ACLU and 
Lambda Legal off er websites addressing 
ways in which individuals can get involved 
to effect change at the local level. SALT's 
hosting of a Solomon Amendment website 
certainly fits within this approach to 
facilitating local political action and 
change. SALT's members are a busy lot, 
sometimes even-<lare I say-over-commit-
ted. We need to consider how SALT can best 
facilitate the often local activism for 
change that makes possible larger victories 
such as Lawrence. Such activism on the 
local level is also what will translate the 
promise of decisions such as Lawrence 




Rejoice and Refuel: Reflections on Grutter 
Emily M.S. Houh, University of Cincinnati College of Law Commentary on Grutter v. Bollinger 
When I first got word of the Supreme Court's ruling in Grutter v. Bollinger on that June 
day, I literally jumped out of my chair in my office, squealed with delight, and began 
running and jumping down the hallways of our faculty floor, yelling, "They ruled in favor of 
Michigan! The policy's been upheld! WOO-HOO!" Looking back on it now, perhaps this 
wasn't the most appropriate way to respond, given that I had been in residence at my new 
school for only a couple of weeks. I probably should have just calmly e-mailed our faculty 
listserv about Michigan's victory, as several of my more seasoned colleagues had. But then, it 
felt really good to be exuberant! When years of individual and collective anxiety, anger, hard 
work, and coalition building pay off in such a concrete way, why not leap for joy? Never mind 
that I hadn't yet read the opinion; at that moment, I was ecstatic for one reason alone: We 
had won! 
I say "we" not only as a member of a progressive community that supports affirmative 
action and, more broadly, the dismantling of white supremacy and sexual subordination; I 
say "we" also because I am a graduate of the University of Michigan Law School ('96) . I 
graduated a couple years before Ms. Grutter, et al., filed the lawsuit, and had participated in 
the Law School's Minority Affairs Program ("MAP") as a first-year student. Within our 
cohort, 1 rumors had always circulated about irate majority students who claimed that we had 
"exclusive" access to imagined "special perks," as well as of disgruntled majority applicants 
whose places we had "stolen." As we studiedBakke2 in our constitutional law classes, we 
wondered collectively if and when the ugly rumors of impending lawsuits challenging the 
constitutionality of the MAP program and the admissions policy would ever materialize. Only 
a few years later, of course, the rumors of the admissions lawsuit proved true, and the Grutter 
and Gratz complaints were filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michi-
gan, where I was clerking at the time. My stake in the outcome of the Michigan cases, 
however, grew not only out of a general commitment to social equality and a temporal and 
physical proximity to the litigation, but also out of my experiences as a law student at 
Michigan. 
During those three years the administration at Michigan saw a great deal of organizing 
by progressive students: We were African-American, Latino/a, Asian Pacific-American, 
American Indian, lesbian, gay, and bisexual, straight, and white. We joined and participated 
with a vengeance in public interest and reading groups, organized conferences and panels, 
started a journal, and organized to demand curricular changes and diversity in faculty hiring. 
We fought about strategies, programs, and the ultimate goals of our organizing. We pulled 
all-nighters doing work that did not involve preparing for class, but taught us to be good 
strategists and activists. We missed classes in order to meet what we believed were more 
important deadlines. We did the hard work that is always involved in good coalition activism, 
and were rewarded with some positive and permanent changes to the institution, incredible 
and lasting friendships, and a heartfelt sense of collective empowerment and purpose. I am 
certain that my classmates from Michigan are still driven in their practice, teaching, and 
writing by the same principles and passions that drove us in law school. Without one 
another-that is, if the student body had not been as diverse as it had been at the time-I'm 
not sure where we'd all be or what we'd be doing now. Would we be (even more) jaded and 
embittered (than we are) about our law school experiences? Would we be burned out by our 
practice, whether public interest or big firm? Would we have stopped feeling a sense of 
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Affirmative Action2 
SALT Co-President Paula C. Johnson, 
Syracuse University College of Law 
When the Supreme Court issued the 
intensely anticipated decisions in the 
University of Michigan cases, Grutter v. 
Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger, many 
of us who were wary of the Court's position 
on affirmative action found much to 
applaud in the Court's opinions. For the 
first time since Regents of Univ. of Calif 
v. Bakke, in 1978, the U.S. Supreme Court 
reaffirmed the constitutionality of race-
conscious admissions in higher educa-
tional programs. In its ruling, the Court in 
Grutter (5-4) left no doubt that it adopted 
Justice Powell's pivotal opinion in Bakke, 
in which diversity in higher education was 
found to constitute a compelling state 
interest. As Justice O'Connor wrote, 
"[T]oday we endorse Justice Powell's view 
that student body diversity is a compelling 
state interest that can justify the use of 
race in university admissions." 
Moreover, the Court issued an un-
equivocal pronouncement on the impor-
tance of racial and ethnic diversity in 
higher education and to the society at 
large. In this regard,Justice O'Connor 
stated in Grutter, "In order to cultivate a 
set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of 
the citizenry, it is necessary that the path to 
leadership be visibly open to talented and 
qualified individuals of every race and 
ethnicity." Such strong recognition of the 
governmental interest in racial and ethnic 
diversity is a salutary development in the 
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intending to apply to the Law School, 
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gratitude for and pride in the work of those 
who came before and after us? Would we 
have been sapped of the energy and long-
term commitment required to engage in 
social justice activism? A loss in Grutter 
would have meant not only a major 
setback in the struggle toward 
sociopolitical equality and justice; it 
would have meant personal defeat, in the 
deepest sense. Perhaps that is why I 
couldn't refrain from running the 
hallways on that June day. 
* * * 
Yet, looking back on those law school 
experiences, I can't help but wonder 
whether we could have done better. After 
all, although we had some success, 
Michigan's very large faculty still includes 
very few tenured or tenure-track faculty of 
color, and every year student groups 
working together at Michigan solicit 
alumni support as they diligently continue 
to fight for faculty and curricular diversity. 
As a Michigan alum, it is deeply satisfying 
to know that in part because of the Grutter 
decision, student activism will continue to 
flourish at the University of Michigan Law 
School, even where this most certainly will 
translate into students continuing to give 
hell to the administration and faculty for 
their own homogeneity. The best example 
of student activism at Michigan, of course, 
can be found simply by looking to the 
Grutter litigation itself. Fortunately for 
all of us, the student intervenors in 
Grutter had the courage to stake their 
(and our) claims in the litigation, which 
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
permitted, following the district court's 
initial denial of their motion to intervene. 
The student intervenors included Michigan 
SALT Equalizer 
and high school students from various 
public schools in the city of Detroit. 
Having grown up in the Detroit suburbs, I 
can attest to the chronic residential and 
educational segregation and inequality 
that continue to plague not only the 
metropolitan Detroit area. At trial, the 
student intervenors presented thorough and 
compelling evidence and testimony about 
the realities and impact of this segregation 
and inequality, thus bringing to light 
what was really at stake in a material 
"We should. .. continue 
to feel and express 
exuberance over the 
victory won in Grutter, 
but as we do so, we 
must be sure to re-
fuel for the many 
battles to come and 
plan for a time when 
we can finally go on 
the offensive." 
sense for so many: the struggle for racial 
and educational equality and the impor-
tance of integration in that struggle. 
Proudly, SALT, in an amicus brief filed in 
support of Michigan, 3 also made compel-
ling arguments to the Supreme Court 
about the effects of residential and 
educational segregation and inequality in 
metropolitan Detroit; Justice Ginsburg 
noted these effects in her concurring 
opinion.4 And while the student interve-
nors were neither credited nor mentioned 
by the Supreme Court for the extraordinary 
evidence they placed in the record-
evidence that, in part, made the Court's 
ruling possible given its composition-the 
spirit of their arguments seems to have 
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found its way into the majority and 
concurring opinions. 
Indeed, as is probably true for many of 
us, when I first picked up Justice 
O'Connor's majority opinion in Grutter, I 
had braced myself for disappointing 
equivocality, but found myself pleasantly 
surprised. Although there is certainly room 
for critique of the opinion and, more 
broadly, the way in which the "liberal 
defense of affirmative action"5 dominated 
Michigan's arguments and those of many 
of its supporters, I was struck by sentences 
in the opinion such as: "Context matters 
when reviewing race-based governmental 
action under the Equal Protection 
Clause . .. . Not every decision influenced 
by race is equally objectionable and strict 
scrutiny is designed to provide a framework 
for carefully examining the importance 
and sincerity of the reasons advanced by 
the governmental decisionmaker for the 
use of race in that particular context. "6 
Could it be that this really was an 
O'Connor opinion? Had she at last gained 
some sense and reason in matters relating 
to affirmative action? As I read on, it 
appeared that she had, at least in part. 
In distinguishing this case from her 
other (disastrous) affirmative action 
opinions, for example, O'Connor had 
taken to heart the "important purpose of 
public education and the expansive 
freedoms of speech and thought associated 
with the university environment," the 
public university's "special niche in our 
constitutional tradition," and the real 
significance of a public university's First 
Amendment right to "educational 
autonomy. "7 It was a relief to know that 
the Court seemed to understand what 
academic freedom is actually about: a 
university's freedom to make its own 
decisions concerning its goals, programs, 
and "the selection of its student body."8 
Emphasizing this special educational 
context.Justice O'Connor, joined by 
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and 
Breyer, resolved the controversial issue left 
August 2003 
open in Bakke of whether diversity is a 
compelling state interest in the context of 
public higher education by holding 
resoundingly that it is.9 Subsequently, the 
Court upheld the Law School's admissions 
policy-which is based on the assemblage 
of a diverse student body that includes a 
"critical mass" of students of color-as 
being narrowly tailored to serve this 
compelling state interest, and rejected Ms. 
Grutter's argument that the Law School's 
use of the "critical mass" concept 
constituted a functional quota.10 In so 
doing, O'Connor considered the "real" and 
"substantial" educational benefits flowing 
from a diverse student body. She noted in 
particular that: 
T] he Law School's admissions policy 
promotes "cross-racial understand-
ing," helps to break down racial 
stereotypes, and "enables [students] to 
better understand persons of different 
races." ... 
[N] umerous studies show that 
student body diversity promotes 
learning outcomes, and "better 
prepares students for an increasingly 
diverse workforce and society, and 
better prepares them as professionals." 
These benefits are not theoretical 
but real, as major American busi-
nesses have made clear that the skills 
needed in today's increasingly global 
marketplace can only be developed 
through exposure to widely diverse 
people, culture, ideas, and viewpoints. 
This court has long recognized that 
"education ... is the very foundation 
of good citizenship." For this reason, 
the diffusion of knowledge and 
opportunity through public institu-
tions of higher education must be 
accessible to all individuals regardless 
of race or ethnicity .... Effective 
participation by members of all racial 
and ethnic groups in the civic life of 
our Nation is essential if the dream of 
SALT Equalizer 
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one Nation, indivisible, is to be 
realized. 
Moreover, universities, and in 
particular, law schools, represent the 
training ground for a large number of 
our Nation's leaders .... In order to 
cultivate a set of leaders with 
Commentary on Grutter v. Bollinger 
legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, 
it is necessary that the path to 
leadership be visibly opened to 
talented and qualified individuals of 
every race and ethnicity. All members 
of our heterogeneous society must 
have confidence in the openness and 
integrity of the educational institu-
tions that provide this training. 11 
While this language is astonishing in 
some ways, it is not in others. The Court, 
for example, failed to acknowledge the 
"not theoretical but real" disparities 
between whites and people of color in 
their/our "effective participation ... in 
civic life," which disparities are reflected 
most significantly in the socioeconomic 
and political disempowerment and 
disenfranchisement of communities of 
color in the United States. Moreover, 
O'Connor's reference to the United States' 
economic success in the global market-
place and that success's dependence on 
diversity (arguments that were made in the 
amicus brief filed in support of the Law 
School by General Motors and other large, 
likeminded corporations12) stirs some 
feelings of unease. 13 While the economic 
and business justifications for diversity 
might be compelling to many, justifica-
tions more firmly and explicitly rooted in 
principles embodied by notions of 
substantive equality and anti-subordina-
tion struggle would have been even more 
so. 
And what are we to make of the Court's 
ruling that the Law School's policy of 
admitting and enrolling a "critical mass" 
of students of color is a narrowly tailored 
means by which to achieve the compelling 
state interest of diversity? On the one hand, 
Michigan's implementation of the critical 
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mass admissions policy can be seen as 
anti-essentialism theory in practice. 
Although this was something that Ms. 
Grutter's lawyers and the district court 
never quite got a handle on, O'Connor 
understood the fundamentals of anti-
essentialism (though not to a radical 
extent), even if she did not use the 
language of critical race feminists: 
The Law School does not premise its 
need for critical mass on "any belief 
that minority students always (or even 
consistently) express some characteris-
tic minority viewpoint on any issue." 
To the contrary, diminishing the force 
of such stereotypes is both a crucial 
part of the Law School's mission, and 
one that it cannot accomplish with 
only token numbers of minority 
students. Just as growing up in a 
particular region or having particular 
professional experiences is likely to 
affect an individual's views, so too is 
one's own, unique experience of being 
a racial minority in a society, like our 
own, in which race unfortunately still 
matters .... 
[T] he Law School engages in a 
highly individualized, holistic review 
of each applicant's file, giving serious 
consideration to all the ways an 
applicant might contribute to a 
diverse educational environment. The 
Law School affords this individualized 
consideration to applicants of all 
races. 14 
Michigan's reliance on the critical 
mass concept was well placed not only 
because it won O'Connor's swing vote, but 
also because it compelled the Court to 
concede that in our society today, race still 
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twenty-five, particularly given how 
Commentary on Grutter v. Bollinger slowly we have progressed in the 
twenty-five years since Bakke. 
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matters. 
On the other hand, the "critical mass" 
concept did not compel the Court (for it 
was not designed for this purpose) to 
reconsider in any meaningful way its neo-
conservative dream of the "colorblind 
society." 15 Just as troubling are the 
presumptions underlying the critical mass 
concept that minority students are 
valuable first and foremost for the 
educational benefits they will confer on 
their majority classmates, and that they 
have an obligation to confer those benefits 
in the first place. While it is true that all 
of us benefit from the breaking down of 
stereotypes, students of color are far more 
susceptible to being typed in specific and 
particularly negative ways by their peers, 
teachers, and potential employers than are 
majority students; consequently, they must 
do more to "diminish the force of such 
stereotypes" than their majority counter-
parts. Analogously, and for a long time 
now, feminists of color engaged in largely 
white feminist movements have expressed 
their/our frustration over having to 
educate white feminists about race, as well 
as over the expectation that they/we will do 
so. Is this analogous burden in the law 
school context a fair one to place on 
students of color, whether or not they are 
part of a critical mass? And how will the 
critical mass theory of admissions affect 
the future of affirmative action in the 
educational context? Will we ever be able 
to get beyond the critical mass, assuming 
that we want to? The Court says that we 
have twenty-five years to figure that out. 
Although, according to Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, affirmative action programs 
are to be temporary remedies, 16 it is not 
clear why O'Connor chose the number 
SALT Equalizer 
* * * 
Ironically, even though Michigan-
with the support of scores of other law 
schools, colleges, and universities17-fought 
and won (for now) the good fight to 
preserve affirmative action in the context 
of admissions, it appears that neither the 
Law School nor most of its peer institu-
tions have been quite as committed to that 
fight in the context off aculty hiring ... 
but that is a topic for another time and 
forum. Other affirmative action battles 
continue to loom large before us. In the 
wake of Grutter, for example, University of 
California Regent Ward Connerly has 
"joked" (and thus, we should take him 
quite seriously) that he will bring his anti-
affirmative action ballot initiative to 
Michigan and other states, and our 
opponents have already committed 
themselves to bringing new challenges to 
affirmative action policies that do comply 
with Grutter. On an even more potentially 
devastating front, Connerly is also behind 
Proposition 54 in California, which 
proposes a state constitutional amend-
ment, officially titled the Classification by 
Race, Ethnicity, Color, or National Origin 
initiative (also known as, in the clever 
rhetoric of its proponents, the Racial 
Privacy Initiative), which would bar state 
and local agencies from collecting, 
compiling, or using information about 
race and ethnicity. 18 We can well imagine 
the nightmarish consequences of such an 
initiative passing in California, 19 where so 
many conservative movements seem to 
find their legs before going national. And 
then, of course, there is global war and 
occupation, which I cannot even begin to 
discuss in this commentary, for fear of 
trivializing and oversimplifying the 
devastating and far-reaching effects of 
what may tum into a new era of American 
imperialism. Here, I simply echo Mari 
Matsuda's call to make the linkages-in 
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our teaching, writing, practice, and 
activism-between war, occupation, and 
our domestic civil rights struggles. All of 
this gloom and doom and the accompany-
ing call for perseverance is not to say that 
we should not continue to feel and express 
exuberance over the victory won in Grutter, 
but as we do so, we must be sure to re-fuel 
for the many battles to come and plan for 
a time when we can finally go on the 
offensive. 
Endnotes: 
1. This cohort included several 
classmates who went on to become law 
professors, such as Guy Uriel-Charles of the 
University of Minnesota, Jeannine Bell of 
Indiana University-Bloomington, and Luis 
Fuentes-Rowher, also of IV-Bloomington. 
2• Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 
438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
3. The SALT amicus brief can be 
accessed on the SALT website at http:// 
saltlaw.org/gruttersaltbrief.pdf, or on the 
University of Michigan website at http:// 
www.umich.edu/-urel/admissions/legal/ 
gru _amicus-ussc/um/SALT-gru.pdf. 
4. Grutter v. Bollinger,_ U.S._, 
123 S. Ct. 2325, 2348 (2003) (Ginsburg,]., 
concurring) (citing to statistics relating to 
educational segregation and stating: 
"[S]chools in predominantly minority 
communities lag far behind others 
measured by the educational resources 
available to them. However strong the 
public's desire for improved education 
systems may be, it remains the current 
reality that many minority students 
encounter markedly inadequate and 
unequal educational opportunities." 
(citations omitted)). 
5. Charles R. Lawrence III, Two Views 
of the River: A Critique of the Liberal 
Defense of Affirmative Action, 101 CowM. 
L. REV. 928 (2001). 
6. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2338 (citations 
omitted) . 
7. Id at 2339. 
8. Id 
9. "Today, we hold that the Law School 
August 2003 
has a compelling state interest in attain-
ing a diverse student body." Id 
10• Id at 2343. 
11. Id at 2339-41. 
12· A link to the amicus brief filed by 
GM, et al., in support of the Law School 
can be accessed athttp://www.umich.edu/ 
-ureVadmissions/legal/gru_amicus-ussc/ 
um/GM-both.pdf. 
13· Thanks to Neil Gotandafor his 
insightful observations concerning this 
point, which were posted during a lively 
discussion of the Grutter case that took 
place on the AALS Minority Lawprofs 
Listserv shortly after the Court had issued 
its decision. 
14• Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2341, 2343. 
15• Id at 2350-65 (Thomas,]., 
dissenting); see, e.g., City of Richmond v. 
Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 520-28 (1989) 
(Scalia,]., concurring). 
16. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 
510 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring); United 
States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987). 
17. For a complete listing of and links 
to amicus briefs filed in support of the 
Law School in the Grutter case, including 
several briefs filed on behalf of no fewer 
than 60 colleges, universities, and law 
schools, see http://www.umich.edu/-ureV 
admissions/legal/gru_amicus-ussc/ 
um.html. 
1s Fo info . . · r more irnormat1on on Proposi-
tion 54, see the Coalition for an Informed 
California website (http:// 
www.informedcalifornia.org/facts.shtml) 
and the Californians for Justice Education 
Fund website (http://www.caljustice.org/ 
issues_elections.shtml). 
19· For example, according to the 
Californians for Justice Education Fund ' passage of CRECNO will "[  e] ndanger the 
health and safety of all communities; 
[h] amper . .. efforts to fight the spread of 
disease; [ u] ndermine school reform and 
educational equity; [and] [a]llow racial 





continued from page 7 Commentary on Grutter v. Bollinger 
ongoing struggle for inclusion throughout 
American society, including in institutions 
of higher learning. 
Nevertheless, there are questions and 
areas of concern raised by the Court's 
opinion which may impact the future of 
affirmative action and the goal to end 
racism in American society. These areas are 
discussed below. 
1. First, as an overarching matter, the 
Court limited the debate on affirmative 
action to the diversity rationale. This is 
understandable, of course, as this was the 
sole basis upon which the University of 
Michigan justified its admissions 
programs. The University based its defense 
on the prerogative of colleges and universi-
ties to determine the manner in which the 
educational mission was accomplished. 
The exercise of this prerogative included 
admissions decisions designed to achieve a 
highly qualified and diverse student body 
population for the individual and 
collective educational enterprise. Justice 
O'Connor accepted this rationale without 
reservation, and found no contradiction 
between the University's goal of academic 
excellence and racial and ethnic diversity. 
She stated," [T]he Law School's race-
conscious admissions program adequately 
ensures that all factors that may contrib-
ute to student body diversity are meaning-
fully considered alongside race in admis-
sions decisions. With respect to the use of 
race itself, all underrepresented minority 
students admitted by the Law School have 
been deemed qualified." 
Yet, by giving scant attention to the 
social inequities that generate the need for 
affirmative action programs in the first 
instance, the Court virtually absolves 
governmental and other societal institu-
tions of the responsibility to eradicate 
racial and economic injustice at the heart 
Page 11 
of disparate and discriminatory treatment 
in education and throughout American 
society in a systematic way. Justice 
O'Connor's recognition of these underlying 
issues is bnef. Finding that a "critical 
mass" of students of color is not tanta-
mount to a quota system, she notes in 
Grutter: 
[D] iminishing the force of such 
stereotypes is both a crucial part of the 
Law School's mission, and one that it 
cannot accomplish with only token 
numbers of minority students. Just as 
growing up in a particular region or 
having particular professional 
experiences is likely to affect an 
individual's views, so too is one's own, 
unique experience of being a racial 
minority in a society, like our own, in 
which race unfortunately still 
matters. 
She also observes that racial inequality 
may account for disparate educational and 
societal experiences between students of 
color and white students, noting that 
"[B]y virtue of our Nation's struggle with 
racial inequality, [minority students] are 
both likely to have experiences of particu-
lar importance to the Law School's 
mission, and less likely to be admitted in 
meaningful numbers on criteria that 
ignore those experiences." However, as the 
amicus brief filed by the Society of 
American L aw Teachers (and briefs filed by 
mtervenors on behalf of students of color) 
argued, such racial justice concerns 
warranted.fuller direct attention by the 
Court. As SALT demonstrated in our brief 
deliberate governmental policies in the ' 
State of Michigan led to residential 
segregation, discrimination in primary, 
secondary and higher education, and 
fam 1bmorrow continued on page 12 
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The general absence of the 
,, discrimination claims in the Court's 
Commentary on Grutter v. Boldnger opinion helps to further embed factors 
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employment discrimination. In addition, 
the University's reliance on the LSAT, with 
its cultural, gender, and economic biases, 
had a disparate impact on minority 
students seeking admission to the state 
university. For these reasons, SALT urged 
the Court to incorporate these salient 
arguments regarding racial disparity and 
injustice into its decision. 
In large measure, such concerns were 
ignored, with the notable exception of 
Justice Ginsburg's concurring opinion. 
Where Justice O'Connor is indirect, Justice 
Ginsburg is straightforward: 
It is well documented that conscious 
and unconscious race bias, even rank 
discrimination based on race, remain 
alive in our land, impeding realiza-
tion of our highest values and 
ideals .. .. As to public education, data 
for the years 2000-2001 show that 
71.6% of African-American children 
and 76.3% of Hispanic children 
attended a school in which minorities 
made up a majority of the student 
body .. . . And schools in predomi-
nantly minority communities lag far 
behind others measured by the 
educational resources available to 
them. However strong the public's 
desire for improved education systems 
may be, it remains the current reality 
that many minority students 
encounter markedly inadequate and 
unequal educational opportunities. 
Despite these inequalities, some 
minority students are able to meet the 
high threshold requirements set for 
admission to the country's finest 
undergraduate and graduate educa-
tional institutions. 
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such as geographical and residential 
location, status as offspring of alumni, 
racially segregated and under-resourced 
secondary schools, availability (or lack 
thereof) of advanced placement courses, 
and over-reliance on standardized testing, 
as non-neutral racially disparate determi-
nants of admission to institutions of 
higher learning. Inevitably, these issues 
will be raised in future considerations of 
affirmative action, so long as dispropor-
tionate poverty levels within Native 
American, Latina/o, African-American, and 
several Asian-American communities 
persist. For instance, the Children's Defense 
Fund (CDF) recently reported that "the 
number of extremely poor black children is 
now at its highest level in the 23 years for 
which such data exist." CDF also noted 
that extreme poverty has deepened since 
the implementation of welfare to work 
requirements enacted in 1996 and that 
"fewer and fewer otherwise extremely poor 
children of all races receive cash public 
assistance. A growing number have no 
assistance, despite their extreme poverty." 
Obviously, high poverty rates within 
communities of color will have a deleteri-
ous impact on learning opportunities at 
all educational levels. While the Court 
declined to formally address racial 
discrimination claims in Grutter and 
Gratz, these disparities remain at the heart 
of why affirmative action is necessary, and 
why diverse racial and ethnic perspectives 
are key to understanding, shaping and 
implementing American law and policy. 
2. Another area of concern lies in the 
primary basis for the split opinions in 
Grutter and Gratz, namely the constitu-
tionality of the specific admissions policies 
in the law school and the undergraduate 
program. By a 5-4 margin, the Court 
determined that the admissions policy by 
the University of Michigan Law School, 
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which considers race and ethnicity in a 
nuanced manner, was constitutionally 
acceptable. As such, race-consciousness is 
permissible as long as it is conducted in a 
holistic, nuanced manner, in which the 
qualifications and attributes of each 
applicant is compared against those of 
other individual applicants. However, by a 
6-3 margin, with Justice O'Connor joining 
Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority 
opinion, the Court found that the 
University of Michigan undergraduate 
program's 150 point system, in which 20 
points were assigned to minority appli-
cants, was not narrowly tailored and 
thereby violated the Equal Protection 
Clause. In this regard, the Court found that 
the undergraduate policy placed too much 
emphasis on race in an inflexible, 
determinative way. 
Upon closer consideration, however, it 
is difficult to find a convincing basis for 
the Court's distinction between the 
program upheld in the law school, and 
that struck down in the undergraduate 
program. Hence the distinction between a 
policy that is constitutionally acceptable 
and that which is not seems to be the 
difference between the oblique and the 
obvious consideration of race in university 
admissions. As Justices Souter and 
Ginsburg noted in separate dissents in 
Gratz, the undergraduate program 
contained an objective scale that adhered 
to the racial "plus factor" system that 
Justice Powell approved in Bakke. By 
assigning a range of point values to several 
hard and soft admissions criteria, indi-
vidual assessments of candidates was 
conducted and admission was not 
guaranteed on the basis of race. Thus, it is 
ironic that the Court rejected the point 
system in Gratz, as the University sought 
an objective and flexible approach to the 
admissions decision. 
What is particularly troubling about 
the Court's distinction, however, is the 
preference for vague consideration of race 
in admissions, when the Court has 
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acknowledged the significance of race in 
American life and educational opportu-
nity. The Court's disapproval of the 
undergraduate program's clear approach to 
considering race and other relevant 
attributes in the admissions decision will 
make it more difficult to deal with race 
and racial disparity forthrightly. In 
contrast, in upholding the law school's 
policy, the Court perpetuates the minimi-
zation and obscure consideration of race 
and ethnicity in areas where it matters 
most. This lack of transparency in dealing 
with racial issues seems to reflect the 
American public's continual denial of the 
salience of such matters. Thus, while 
public opinion polls by Pew, Cornell 
University and others reveal that a 
substantial majority of the American 
public supports affirmative action in 
theory, many (primarilywhites) oppose 
specific programs that would ensure its 
effectiveness. 
For this reason, the Court's opinion in 
Grutter, while a victory for the recognition 
of racial and ethnic diversity in higher 
education, may have the counterproductive 
effect of upholding the principle of 
affirmative action while allowing only 
minimal consideration of race and 
ethnicity in university admissions. This 
unfortunate result would serve to further 
inculcate the underlying racial discrimi-
nation that makes affirmative action 
necessary, especially for the lack of 
attention to matters of race. 
3. In light of the Court's reluctance to 
expressly acknowledge the persistence of 
racism and inequity in American social 
institutions, perhaps the most troubling 
aspect of the Court's decision in Grutter is 
Justice O'Connor's ostensible establish-
ment of an endpoint for affirmative action 
in twenty-five years. She stated in the 
opinion, "We  expect that 25 years from 
now the use of racial preferences will no 
longer be necessary to further the interest 
approved today." In a subsequent interview 
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in the Chicago Tribune, Justice 
O'Connor clarified that her mention of 
the twenty-five year period was an 
expression of hope, not a firm deadline. 
However, opponents of affirmative action 
have seized upon this time-frame as a 
constitutional line in the sand. 
Commentary on Grutter v. Bollinger 
Justice O'Connor's expressed desire for 
an end to affirmative action within a 
generation is consistent with her philoso-
phy of color-blind constitutional analysis 
and her wish for a nation in which racial 
and ethnic distinctions no longer exist. As 
her previous opinions on affirmative 
action and voting rights indicate, she views 
continued recognition of race and 
ethnicity in law as not per se impermis-
sible, but as divisive forces in American 
society. The erasure of racial, ethnic, and 
cultural uniqueness is a peculiar aspira-
tion, in my view, and one that ultimately 
would deprive the nation of the strength, 
acumen, creativity, and resourcefulness of 
people from diverse backgrounds who are 
Americans. Thus, I believe that Justice 
O'Connor's insistence on a color-blind 
society is not constitutionally required, nor 
socially desirable. 
4. While advocating a color-blind 
society,Justice O'Connor nevertheless 
retains a degree of realism upon recogniz-
ing the significance of race and ethnicity 
in American society and by extension in 
constitutional analysis. However, her 
conservative brethren on the Court would 
reject any attention to race by government 
as wholly impermissible and violative of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. In this regard, 
Justice Thomas's dissent in Grutter 
warrants particular discussion. Justices 
O'Connor and Thomas share the belief in 
a color-blind America, albeit from 
different vantage points. Justice O'Connor 
believes attention to race to be detrimental 
to the nation, whereas Justice Thomas 
believes attention to be detrimental to the 
putative beneficiary of beneficial racial 
programs. Justice Thomas invokes his 
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racial identity as an African-American and 
his discomfort with having benefitted 
from affirmative action as the starting 
point for his dissenting opinion. 
For purposes of arguing against race-
based affirmative action,Justice Thomas 
quotes Frederick Douglass, speaking to 
abolitionists on January 1, 1865: 
[I] n regard to the colored people, 
there is always more that is benevo-
lent, I perceive than just, manifested 
towards us. What I ask for the negro is 
not benevolence, not pity, not 
sympathy, but simply justice. The 
American people have always been 
anxious to know what they shall do 
with us . ... I have but one answer 
from the beginning. Do nothing with 
us! If the apples will not remain on 
the tree of their own strength, if they 
are worm-eaten at the core, if they are 
early ripe and disposed to fall, let 
them fall! ... And if the negro cannot 
stand on his own legs, let him fall 
also. All I ask is, give him a chance to 
stand on his own legs! Let him alone! 
[Y] our interference is doing him 
positive injury. 
This quote, while representative of 
Frederick Douglass's views, is quickly 
revealed as disingenuous as used by Justice 
Thomas upon recognizing that Douglass's 
hopes for African-Americans in U.S. society 
did not materialize. When Frederick 
Douglass called upon the U.S. government 
to "leave the negro alone," he spoke two 
years after the Emancipation Proclama-
tion of]anuary 1, 1863: His was an appeal 
for fairness, enfranchisement, and full 
citizenship for African-Americans. But the 
Nation did not "leave the negro alone." 
Hence, events before and after the incep-
Jam Tomorrow continued on page I 4 
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every tum of the road. If he comes 
in rags and wretchedness, he answers 
the public demand for a negro, and 
provokes no anger, though he may 
provoke derision, but if he presumes 
Jam Tomorrow: 
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ti on of the nation, including slavery, 
segregation, Jim Crow, Black Codes, 
terrorist marauders, disenfranchisement, 
land dispossession, and discrimination in 
education and employment, relegated 
African-Americans to slavery and near-
slavery conditions after the Civil War. So 
steeped was the nation in racist ideology of 
Anglo-American superiority andAfrican-
American inferiority that Black soldiers 
were not pennitted to serve in the Union 
forces in the struggle for their own 
emancipation, and as confederate forces 
pressed Blacks into service as military slave 
laborers. When Lincoln finally relented, 
due in large measure to Dou glass's 
entreaties, Black soldiers served gallantly, 
under worse conditions and with less pay 
than their white counterparts. 
Thus, while Douglass tirelessly 
advocated for racial equality, his speech on 
April 16, 1883, twenty years after the 
Emancipation Proclamation, expressed his 
disappointment at the lack of rights 
accorded to Black citizens, and bears 
excerpting at length: 
Let any man now claim for the 
negro, or, worse still, let the negro now 
claim for himself, any right, 
privilege, or immunity which has 
hitherto been denied by law or 
custom, and he will at once open a 
fountain of bitterness, and call forth 
overwhelming wrath. 
It is his sad lot to live in a land 
where all presumptions are arrayed 
against him, unless we accept the 
presumption of inferiority and 
worthlessness. If his course is down-
ward, he meets very little resistance, 
but if upward, his way is disputed at 
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to be a gentleman and a scholar, he is 
then entirely out of his place. He 
excites resentment and calls forth 
stem and bitter opposition. If he offers 
himself to a builder as a mechanic, to 
a client as a lawyer, to a patient as a 
physician, to a university as a 
professor, or to a department as a 
clerk, no matter what may be his 
ability or his attainments, there is a 
presumption, based upon his color or 
his previous condition, of incompe-
tency, and if he succeeds at all, he had 
to do so against this most discourag-
ing presumption. 
It is a real calamity, in this country, 
for any man, guilty or not guilty, to 
be accused of crime, but it is an 
incomparably greater calamity for 
any colored man to be so accused. 
Justice is often painted with bandaged 
eyes. She is described in forensic 
eloquence, as utterly blind to wealth 
or poverty, high or low, white or black; 
but a mask of iron, however thick, 
could never blind American justice, 
when a black man happens to be on 
trial. Here, even more than elsewhere, 
he will find all presumptions of law 
and evidence against him. It is not so 
much the business of his enemies to 
prove him guilty, as it is the business 
of himself to prove his innocence. 
Despite his recognition that the nation 
had not "left the negro alone," Douglass 
remained confident in the ability of 
Americans and the U.S. government to be 
fair. Yet at the Republican convention of 
1876, he asked, "Do you mean to make 
good to us the promises of your constitu-
tion?" The fulfillment of the promises of 
fairness and full citizenship bespeaks the 
continuing need for affinnative action. 
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5. In the short and long run, commu-
nities of color also prefer an end to the 
need for affinnative action. They recog-
nize, however, that affinnative action will 
no longer be necessary once the entrenched 
structural inequalities in educational 
opportunity for children of color cease to 
exist. Appreciating these preconditions, 
fonner Republican Congressman Jack 
Kemp recently called "shortsighted" his 
fellow conservatives' efforts to continue to 
oppose affinnative action after the Court's 
decision. According to Kemp, "While I 
agree that ultimately a color-blind society 
should be our goal, we certainly are not 
there yet. Blacks were removed from the 
mainstream economy, denied access to 
education, job opportunities and access to 
capital and ownership. Thus, African-
Americans have long been denied their full 
measure of justice under the law, and 
while great progress has been made, we 
have a long way to go." 
Next year, the nation will commemo-
rate the landmark Supreme Court decision 
in Brown v. Board of Education (1954). 
In Brown, a unanimous Supreme Court 
declared racial segregation in primary and 
secondary public schools to be inherently 
unequal, and thereby unconstitutional. We 
need only acknowledge our national 
shortcomings in realizing the promise of 
Brown fifty years later as we contemplate 
the implications of]ustice O'Connor's 
suggested time limitation for affinnative 
action in twenty-five years. Indeed, the 
Harvard Civil Rights Project has revealed 
that racial segregation in K-12 schools is 
greater than it was thirty years ago. HCRP 
attributes this retrogressive phenomenon to 
white flight, increases in enrollment by 
Black, Latino, and Asian students, racially 
segregated housing patterns and other 
fonns of housing discrimination, and the 
tennination of court-ordered desegregation 
decrees. 
Surely, all agree with Justice O'Connor 
that "[a]ccess to legal education (and thus 
the legal profession) must be inclusive of 
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talented and qualified individuals of every 
race and ethnicity, so that all members of 
our heterogeneous society may participate 
in the educational institutions that 
provide the training and education 
necessary to succeed in America." However, 
if higher education is to remain accessible 
to all so that the benefits of equality and 
diversity are achieved, affirmative action 
cannot be terminated by arbitrary date-
setting. Justice Ginsburg best expressed this 
reality in her clear-eyed concurrence in 
Grutter, stating: "[F] rom today's vantage 
point, one may hope, but not firmly 
forecast, that over the next generation's 
span, progress toward nondiscrimination 
and genuinely equal opportunity will 
make it safe to sunset affirmative action." 
About an earlier era, historian Eric 
Foner has written, "From the enforcement 
of the rights of citizens to the stubborn 
problems of economic and racial justice, 
the issues central to Reconstruction are as 
old as the American republic, and as 
contemporary as the inequities that still 
afflict our society." Apropos the current 
discussion, unless and until the nation 
demonstrates the will and commits the 
necessary resources to end racial inequity 
and injustice, affirmative action will 
remain necessary. In the absence of such 
commitment, yesterday will look very 
much like today, and today will look very 
much like tomorrow - jam yesterday, 
jam tomorrow. The Supreme Court's 
decision in Grutter, in which it recognizes 
the signal value of diversity in educational 
and national institutions, provides the 
American public a powerful incentive to 
make the promises of democracy a reality 
for all citizens. 
Endnotes: 
1. Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking 
Glass. 
2• This commentary originally 
appeared in the Jurist, an online legal 
journal. In the version of the essay printed 




Supreme Court Roundup 
Alicia Alvarez, DePaul University College of Law 
The Supreme Court decided a number of significant cases this term in addition to Grutter 
and.Lawrence. (See pages 2-14 for reaction to those decisions.) 
In Demore v. Kim, the Court ruled that mandatory detention of a legal permanent 
resident during deportation proceedings is a constitutionally valid aspect of the process, even 
where there has been no finding that the alien is unlikely to appear for deportation proceed-
ings. Section 1226(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which requires detention 
pending a removal proceeding for aliens convicted of certain crimes, does not violate due 
process, the Court determined. On a positive note, the Court found that Section 1226(e) does 
not deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction to grant habeas relief. The Court distinguished 
Zadvydas, which it decided in 2001. 
In a troubling voting rights decision, Georgia v. Ashcroft, the Court ruled on Georgia's 
State Senate districting plan. The majority (Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy 
and Thomas) reversed and remanded the District Court's finding that the plan violated 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act and was therefore not entitled to preclearance. The Court 
found that the District Court did not consider all relevant factors when it examined whether 
the plan resulted in the retrogression of black voters' effective exercise of the electoral 
franchise. The diminution of a minority group's effective exercise of the electoral franchise 
violates Section 5 only if the state cannot show that the gains in the plan as a whole offset 
the loss in particular districts, the Court said. The courts must consider "all relevant circum-
stances" including the minority voters' ability to elect their candidate of choice (an impor-
tant but not a dispositive or exclusive factor), the extent of the minority group's opportunity 
to participate in the political process (including "influence" districts), and the feasibility of 
creating a nonretrogressive plan. The Court found that Section 5 gives states flexibility, 
allowing them to risk having fewer minority representatives in order to achieve greater overall 
representation of a minority group by increasing the number of representatives sympathetic 
to the interests of minority groups. The District Court focused too narrowly on three districts, 
the Court decided, and improperly rejected evidence that the legislators representing the 
majority-minority districts supported the plan and that the state decided that the best way to 
maximize black voting strength was to unpack the high concentration of minority voters in 
the majority-minority districts. 
The Court ruled in Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington that interest on 
lawyers' trust accounts (IOLTA) programs do not involve a regulatory taking. A law requiring 
that the interest on those funds be transferred to a different owner for a legitimate public use 
could be aper se taking requiring the payment of "just compensation." However, because just 
compensation is measured by the owner's pecuniary loss, which was zero in this case, the 
Court held that there was no violation of the just compensation clause. 
The Court remanded Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians of the Bishop Commu-
nity of the Bishop Colony, a case dealing with tribal sovereignty and state jurisdiction. The 
Bishop Paiute Tribe in California filed an action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to 
establish that state law was preempted to the extent that it puiported to authorize seizure of 
tribal records. The Tribe sought relief under Section 1983, alleging that the District Attorney's 
office had violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments when it obtained and executed a 
search warrant for some of the Tribe's Gaming Coiporation's employment records. The Court 
found that the Tribe cannot sue under Section 1983 since it is not a "person" or "citizen." It 
remanded for consideration of the jurisdictional question of whether any prescription of 
federal common law enables the Tribe to maintain an action for injunctive and declaratory 
relief establishing its sovereign right to be free from state criminal processes. 
Supreme Court continued on page 16 




In United States v. American Library 
Association, the Court upheld the Children's 
Internet Protection Act, which forbids public 
libraries from receiving federal assistance for 
Internet access unless they install software to 
block obscene or pornographic images and 
prevent minors from accessing material 
hannful to them. The Court found the Act 
does not violate the patrons' First Amend-
ment rights, and is a valid exercise of 
Congress' spending power. TheActdoesnot 
impose an unconstitutional condition on 
libraries, the Court determined, and Internet 
access in public libraries is not a public 
forum. Further, the Court found, any 
concerns about constitutional difficulties 
posed by the erroneous blocking of innocu-
ous sites were dispelled by the ease with 
which library patrons can request that 
filtering software be disabled. 
Scheidler v. NOW was a class action 
lawsuit alleging that the defendants, 
individuals and organizations that oppose 
legal abortion, had violated RICO by for 
engaging in a nationwide conspiracy to shut 
down abortion clinics through a pattern of 
racketeering activities that included 
extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act. The 
jury found in favor of the plaintiffs and 
awarded damages; the District Court entered 
a nationwide injunction. The Supreme 
Court reversed, finding that the defendants 
had not committed extortion within the 
meaning of the Hobbs Act because they did 
not "obtain" property from the plaintiffs. 
While the defendants' activities deprived the 
plaintiffs of their ability to exercise their 
property right to legal abortions, said the 
Court, that deprivation did not constitute 
extortion within the meaning of the Hobbs 
Act since extortion requires both deprivation 
and acquisition of property. The defendants 
did not receive something of value that they 
could exercise, transfer or sell. 
Among the many cases in the criminal 
law area, the Court ruled in a favor of a 
capital murder defendant who brought an 
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ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
Writing for the majority in Wiggins v. 
Smith, Justice O'Connor found that trial 
counsel had rendered ineffective assistance 
by failing to investigate and present 
mitigating evidence of the defendant's 
dysfunctional background, including severe 
physical and sexual abuse he had suffered at 
the hands of his mother and in foster care. 
The decision not to expand the investigation 
beyond the presenting investigation report 
and the City Department of Social Services 
records fell short of prevailing professional 
standards, which included the preparation 
of a social history report. The Court found a 
reasonable probability that a jury con-
fronted with evidence of the defendant's 
alcoholic absentee mother, physical 
torment, sexual molestation, repeated rapes 
while in foster care, homelessness, and 
diminished mental capacity would have 
returned a different verdict, especially since 
he had no prior convictions. 
Justice Scalia, joined by Rehnquist, 
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas, found in 
Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania no double-
jeopardy bar to the state seeking the death 
penalty on retrial when the defendant had 
been sentenced to life imprisonment in the 
first trial. Under Pennsylvania law, the 
verdict in the penalty phase of capital 
proceedings must be death if the jury 
unanimously finds at least one aggravating 
circumstance and no mitigating circum-
stance, or one or more aggravating 
circumstances outweighing any mitigating 
circumstances, but it must be life imprison-
ment in all other instances. The court may 
discharge a jury if it determines that the 
jury will not unanimously agree on the 
sentence, but the court must then enter a 
life sentence. The defendant was sentenced 
to life after the judge discharged the jurors 
when they reported that they were dead-
locked 9-3 for life imprisonment. On 
appeal, the court reversed the murder 
conviction and remanded for a new trial. At 
the second trial, the jury imposed a death 
sentence. The Court found that the double 
jeopardy clause applies to capital sentencing 
proceedings that "have the hallmarks of the 
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trial on guilt or innocence." However it said ' ' the relevant inquiry here was whether life 
sentence in the first trial was an "acquittal" 
that was based on findings that the 
defendant was legally entitled to a life 
sentence because the government had failed 
to prove one or more aggravating circum-
stances beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court 
said that the life sentence was not an 
"acquittal" because the jury in the first trial 
deadlocked without making any findings 
with respect to the alleged aggravating 
circumstances, and because the judge had no 
discretion to do anything but enter a life 
sentence after the jury deadlocked. 
In Overton v. Bazzetta, an opinion 
with no dissents, the Court found that 
Michigan's restrictions on prison visits did 
not violate the First, Eighth or Fourteenth 
Amendments. The state's Department of 
Corrections allows inmates to receive visits 
only from qualified clergy, attorneys on 
business, and persons placed on an approved 
list, which may include an unlimited 
number of immediate family members and 
ten others. A minor child may visit only ifs/ 
he is the child, stepchild, grandchild or 
sibling of the inmate, and is accompanied 
by a family member of the child or inmate, 
or by the child's legal guardian. No former 
prisoner may visit unless s/he is an immedi-
ate family member of the inmate and the 
warden approves. Prisoners who commit two 
substance abuse violations may receive only 
clergy and attorneys, but may apply for 
reinstatement of privileges after two years. 
The Court held that these regulations satisfy 
the four factors used to decide whether a 
prison regulation affecting a constitutional 
right that survives incarceration withstands 
constitutional challenge: First, it found, the 
regulations bear a rational relationship to 
legitimate penological interest. Second, the 
inmates have alternative means of exercising 
their asserted right of association (letters and 
telephone). Third, accommodating the right 
would have a considerable impact on the 
guards, other inmates, prison resources and 
the safety of other prisoners. Finally, all 
alternatives have a more than de minimus 
cost. 
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Nancy and Paula's Excellent Adventure: 
The First Running of the Princess Cycling Tour 
SALT Co-President Paula C. Johnson, Syracuse University College of Law, 
and Nancy K. Ota, Albany Law School 
I've got a mule, her name is Sal, 
Fifteen years on the Erie Canal. 
She's a good ol' worker and a good ol' pal, 
Fifteen years on the Erie Canal. 
We've hauled some barges in our day, 
Filled with lumber, coal, and hay, 
And ev 'ry inch of the way we know 
From Albany to Buffalo 
- The Erie Canal Song 
On Sunday, July 13, the Princess Tour-
Paula Johnson, Nancy Ota, Laura Shore, 
and Delores Walters-breezed under the 
green and white balloon arch signaling the 
completion of the summer 2003 bike ride 
along the Erie Canal Towpath. We had 
completed the week-long 400-mile tour 
from Buffalo to Albany, NY, tested our 
physical endurance, enjoyed hours of 
laughter, and helped raise money to 
support SALT's justice work. Not bad for eight days! Come along, and we'll tell you the story 
of our adventure. 
How we got started 
With Albany and Syracuse located just a couple of hours from each other on the New York 
State Thruway, we (Nancy and Paula) frequently talked about getting together just for fun. 
We also talked about our interest in cycling, and how we should explore our local parts of the 
Erie Canal Towpath bike trail when we visited each other. We hadn't been very successful at 
getting together apart from law school or conference functions, though, until this summer. 
Thus, last spring, we became very excited when we saw the announcement for the Fifth 
Annual Bike Ride Across New York, a 400-mile, eight-day bicycle tour from Buffalo to Albany, 
New York, along the historic Erie Canal. Eureka! We jumped at the chance and got our 
partners Laura and Delores involved, too. We all signed onto the ride as soon as they began 
taking names. 
Never leaving our social justice instincts far behind, we also thought there must be some 
way that our physical prowess also could benefit SALT. As SALT's newest and most ambitious 
public interest effort, we decided to lend our bodies to raise money for the Norman Dorsen 
Fund. We thought that enthusiastic (and sympathetic!) SALT members would pledge 
contributions to support us on the ride and to help the Dorsen Fund. We were correct on both 
counts, as many SALT members gave us warm send-offs and many others pledged amounts 
for the Dorsen Fund as we set out to complete the 400 mile trek. 
Cycling continued on page 18 
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SALT Co-President Michael Rooke-Ley, 
Dorsen Fund chairperson Sylvia Law, and 
Sylvia's assistant Leslie Jenkins took care of 
the pledge drive. The four of us simply had 
to take care of trip logistics and getting our 
bodies ready for the ride. Easy. Well, 
maybe not so easy. Our schedules were 
hectic, and winter seemed to hang on 
forever and spring was cooler than usual, 
so it was difficult to take training rides 
consistently. But we were determined and 
stayed in contact with each other by phone 
or e-mail to see how we were doing with 
training. When the weather finally turned 
warm enough, we were off the stationary 
bikes and riding outside several times a 
week. Close to the tour date we cycled 50 
miles in a day, which was the average daily 
mileage during the trip. We were on our 
way! 
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The tour was very well organized. It 
was sponsored by the New York Parks and 
Conservation Association (NYPCA), the 
New York State Canal Corporation, and 
several corporate contributors. It included 
breakfasts, dinners, daily refreshment stops 
stocked with fruit, snacks and beverages, 
baggage transport, sag wagon, daily maps 
and cue sheets, marked routes, lectures and 
stops at historic sites, welcomes by officials 
and civic volunteers in small towns and 
villages, masseuses for body repair, and 
mechanics for bike repair. 
In light of this organization, there 
were only a few other logistics to address, 
primarily transportation to Buffalo and 
housing accommodations during the ride. 
Delores and Paula met Nancy and Laura in 
Albany. We all drove to Buffalo in a rented 
van that we carefully dismantled to 
accommodate our bikes and luggage 
(Delores had shipped her bike to Buffalo 
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from Cincinnati). After getting to Buffalo, 
the most important decision we had to 
make was where to sleep-or more 
accurately, where not to sleep. Most cyclists 
set up camp at prearranged sites at local 
colleges, high schools, and municipal 
parks on the trip. Very early, we decided 
against camping, however. Instead we 
opted for local B&Bs, hotels, motels, and 
dormitories that were listed as housing 
alternatives. This meant arranging taxis 
at the end of the day and in the morning 
back to the breakfast site. This wasn't as 
difficult as it seemed it might be, and we 
were very grateful for mattresses, some 
really good meals, some time away from 
the larger group, and a wonderful time 
together. We especially appreciated the 
hotels and dorms on the nights it rained 
hard. With our daily drop-offs and pick-
ups, ourmonikerwas born: We were 
dubbed "the princess tour." 
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A little history goes a long way 
Groundbreaking for the Erie Canal 
took place on July 4, 1817. It began as the 
political project of Governor DeWitt 
Clinton-"Clinton's Folly." Almost no 
professional engineers were involved in the 
project. Built at a cost of $7 million, the 
Canal was completed in 1825. It was 
called the "Eighth Wonder of the World," 
for as one commentator described, "They 
have built the longest canal, in the least 
time, with the least experience, for the 
least money, and to the greatest public 
benefit." 
The Erie Canal opened the American 
West to commerce and travel, bringing 
financial prosperity and social change 
across New York and the United States. The 
inland waterway facilitated trade from the 
Mississippi to the Atlantic Ocean. The 
original canal featured 18 aqueducts, 83 
locks, and a rise of 568 feet from the 
Hudson River to Lake Erie. From an 
overland trip that previously took four to 
six weeks, the canal cut travel down to five 
to seven days. Due to its financial success, 
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the canal was enlarged four times between 
1836 and 1862. Towns grew along the 
canal route, and many Western and 
Central New York locations remain linked 
to their canal beginnings and maintain 
originals or replicas of the buildings, 
stores, and other facilities that supported 
canal traffic. 
Although financially successful, the 
canal was very costly in terms of human 
lives. Thousands of Irish immigrants were 
employed to dig the canal by hand, and 
many succumbed to malaria and related 
diseases. Further, as a 1990 National 
Geographic article recounts, "Forgotten 
people include immigrant laborers who 
worked on the canal, lived under inhu-
mane Gonditions, and died without 
rousing much concern. Thousands of 
homeless people, escaped slaves, and other 
outcasts roamed the canal looking for 
work." 
In the 1950s, the canal lost business to 
autos, trucks, pipelines, railroads, and the 
St. Lawrence Seaway. With its future 
uncertain, the canal began to deteriorate. 
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In modem times, prospects were further 
dimmed by the steady decline of the 
industrial base of Western and Central New 
York, leaving many low- and moderately-
skilled workers without viable employment 
opportunities. However, many of the canal 
towns are building on their history as the 
path to a resurgent future. In 1983, New 
Yorkers voted to restore the canal system for 
recreational use, irrigation, wildlife 
habitat, hydroelectric power, pleasure boats 
and small commercial vessels. 
Much of the awesome geographical 
beauty of New York remains the same, 
except that which was altered to construct 
the canal. Links to the past and present are 
ever-evident. Along the Mohawk River, for 
instance, Hiawatha united competing 
tribes into the Iroquois Confederacy in 
1600. The Iroquois Confederacy became a 
model for U.S. democracy, and Indians in 
New York continue to assert their cultural 
heritage and influence throughout the 
state. Major abolitionist activity took 
place along the Erie Canal. Enslaved 
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African-Americans risked all for freedom, 
and citizens in Syracuse and other canal 
cities defied the Fugitive Slave Act and 
refused to return enslaved African-
Americans to the South. Also, the women's 
rights movement burgeoned in Seneca 
Falls, eventually spreading across the state 
and the nation. Thus, the bike tour along 
the Erie Canal was an opportunity to slow 
down and appreciate New York's historical, 
cultural, and physical landscape. 
That depends on what your defini-
tion of "flat" is 
The tour was billed as a "ride," not a 
"race." Clearly, though, everyone had 
different goals and expectations for 
embarking on the trip. For some it was 
starting, for others it was finishing. Speed 
was the goal for some riders, while others 
sought consistent pacing. Some, like the 
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man who celebrated the second anniversary 
after his heart attack by riding the tour, 
were just happy to be alive. All of us were 
happy to be there. Individually and 
together we pedaled, pushed, groaned and 
grunted our way across New York on our 
bicycles. 
While we shared housing and meals 
most nights, we never felt cramped or 
imposed upon. This was good because we 
quickly realized the differences in our 
circadian rhythms. Delores andNancy 
were early risers; Laura and Paula were 
dedicated sleepers. Nancy and Laura were 
usually on their bikes earlier than Paula 
and Delores. We typically saw each other 
at breakfast, along the trail, at rest stops, 
and at the end of the day's ride. So there 
was a good mix of being together and also 
hanging out with others on the tour. 
There were over 400 riders on the tour. 
It was a wide-ranging group of folks of all 
ages, sizes, physical abilities, geographical 
backgrounds, and cycling experience. 
Many were veterans of long-distance bike 
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rides, while others, like us, were cycling 
enthusiasts but neophytes at long tours. 
Gender balance seemed pretty equal, but 
there wasn't much racial or ethnic 
diversity-our group provided most of that. 
The gay and lesbian community was well 
represented, and there were many family 
configurations. There were LGBT and 
straight couples, mothers and sons, fathers 
and daughters, straight and LGBT parents 
with infants and toddlers, and grandpar-
ents with grandchildren. 
On this trip, the most prominent 
diversity was reflected in the vehicle of 
choice. Here, there was an eclectic 
assortment of bicycle types to match the 
assorted riders. There were racing bikes, 
touring bikes, mountain bikes, and 
hybrids. There were folding bikes! There 
were tandems and recumbents, and 
tandem recumbents. There were bikes with 
children in tow or child seats in front. 
Some rode with loaded panniers, while 
others carried only water bottles and 
snacks. 
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Local people were fascinated by our 
gang of riders. When we rode on city 
streets, people stopped and watched the 
seemingly endless trail of cyclists. In local 
restaurants, people asked about the tour 
and us, and talked at length about 
themselves, their towns, and what we could 
expect during that portion of the trip. Our 
interactions with local folks were almost 
entirely positive, although there were nasty 
brushes with aggressive drivers. One night 
a friendly cab driver suggested a 
sightseeing tip and offered to take us to the 
town's bar strip. But our raucous laughter 
in the taxi-without alcohol-convinced 
him that we didn't need to visit the bars 
and he recommended taking us directly to 
our hotel. Talking about the events of the 
day and watching the weather channel 
became our favorite entertainment! 
We generally rode for six to eight hours 
a day, in all conceivable weather and road 
conditions. Heavy rains the night before 
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made the next day either torrid or brisk. 
We also had our share of mishaps on the 
bikes. Delores and Nancy each had two 
flats. One rider set a tour record of four 
flats in one day on the same tire; we tried 
to stay away from him! The extreme heat 
bothered Delores; Laura had an allergic 
reaction to insect repellent; Paula 
experienced hand numbness and a sore 
knee; and Nancy deserved a medal for 
persevering despite having tom a ligament 
in her hand during a training ride before 
the trip and taking a hard spill on wet 
railroad tracks during the trip. Undeterred, 
we rode through these discomforts. 
We groused a bit about the terrain. 
The tour booklet had stated, "There are a 
few rolling hills and two long, gradual 
climbs in the Mohawk Valley." In fact, 
there were numerous steep hills, including 
several successive long climbs in the 
Mohawk Valley. In this regard, Friday was 
the most challenging day of the tour, as we 
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rode through head winds, heavy rain, and 
long winding roads. It also was a 70-mile 
day, the end of which required riding up a 
perpendicular road to reach dinner at the 
campground. With just two days left, 
Friday's travails generated the first serious 
talk of quitting by some of the riders. A 
few folks opted for the sag wagon, but most 
of us cycled on, wind, rain, hills and all. 
Magnificent vistas compensated for 
any difficulties along the route. Zooming 
downhill had the incomparable feeling of 
flight and freedom. No matter what the 
place or pace, it was better to be on a bike. 
Traveling by bicycle awakened all of our 
senses, and we took stock after the trip. 
Here is our list of some of the best and 
worst: 
Laura 
Best smell- Strawberry fields in Amish 
country 
Worst smell-The EconoLodge in 
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Canajoharie ("like a combination of bug 
spray, mildew, sour milk, and stinky feet") 
Nancy 
Best sound-Crowd's applause under 
balloons at the end of the ride in Albany 
Worst sound-Helmet (on head) 





Best sight-Lush green farmland in 
Amish country 
Worst sight-Assorted animal roadkill 
Nancy 
Worst touch-Skin scraping pavement 
Delores 
Best touch-The whirlpool 
Laura 
Best touch-Peddling and downshift-
ing 
Paula 
Best touch-Any mattress any night 
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during the tour 
Nancy 
Worst overall-Hills on Rt. SS out of 
Little Falls (Mohawk Valley) 
Laura 
Best overall-Finishing ahead of the 
paint guy marking directions on the road, 
and not thinking about work 
Delores 
Best overall-Barbeque after Friday 
ride 
Paula 
Best Overall-Time on the bike and 
spending time with the "princesses" 
I can't believe I rode the whole 
thing! 
From July 6 to 13, we traveled the 
following schedule: 
Sunday,July 6: Buffalo to Medina (50 
miles) 
Monday, July 7: Medina to Pittsford 
(60miles) 
Tuesday, July 8: Pittsford to Waterloo 
(60miles) 
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Wednesday, July 9: Waterloo/Seneca 
Falls to Syracuse (50 miles) 
Thursday, July 10: Syracuse to Rome 
(SO miles) 
Friday,July 11: Rome to Canajoharie 
(70miles) 
Saturday,July 12: Canajoharie to 
Schenectady (50 miles) 
Sunday,July 13: Schenectady to Albany 
(30miles) 
The final day of the ride was a 
beautiful summer day. We also enjoyed 
some of the easiest terrain; it was mostly 
downhill or level and smooth. We cruised 
through the finish line with energy to 
spare. We felt tremendous joy and 
accomplishment at completing the trek. 
We were further gratified to know that our 
trip benefitted SALT's work. Our final 
mileage exceeded 400 miles, and thanks to 
SALT members, we raised nearly $5,000 for 
the Dorsen Fund. We thank everyone who 
encouraged us on the ride, and everyone 
who contributed to the Dorsen Fund. 
Look out for cyclists; we may come to a 
town near you! 
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Committee News 
Bar Exam Committee 
Plans October Conference 
Eileen Kaufman, Touro Law Center 
The Bar Exam Committee is planning a 
mini-conference for October 11, 2003, at 
the University of Minnesota Law School, to 
coincide with SALT's next Board of 
Governors' meeting. SALT held its first bar 
exam conference in San Francisco in 1999, 
entitled "Re-examining the Bar Examina-
tion," which focused on a critique of the 
current bar examination. The October 11, 
2003, conference, "Reconceiving the Bar 
Examination: Exploring Alternative 
Licensing Mechanisms," moves from a 
critique of the bar exam to a more activist 
agenda that focuses on alternatives to the 
bar exam and strategies for adopting more 
effective licensing approaches. 
The morning session will feature 
speakers describing alternative licensing 
approaches, including Canada's post-
graduate skills training, Arizona's 
"Americorps" proposal and Kris Glen's 
public service alternative. The session 
will also explore the formulation of 
performance-based evaluations. SALT is 
particularly interested in hearing from 
clinicians and others who have successfully 
developed and utilized portfolios of 
competencies and performance-based 
evaluations and who have ideas about 
incorporating these approaches in 
licensing proposals (please contact Eileen 
Kaufman at eileenk@tourolaw.edu).The 
afternoon session will focus on re(orm 
efforts in several jurisdictions in which 
alternatives to the bar exam are currently 
being discussed. 
In related news, Georgia State Univer-
sity is planning a symposium entitled 
"Rethinking the Licensing of New 
Attorneys -An Exploration of Alternatives 
to the Bar Exam." The Symposium will be 
held on January 29, 2004, and will result 
in a special issue of the Georgia State 
University Law Review devoted to articles 
exploring in detail the practical questions 
raised by proposals for alternative methods 
for licensing lawyers. 
Filler Fund Committee Seeks Nominations 
Chris lijima, William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawai'i 
There have been a number of informal discussions recently about how best to fund and 
implement the Filler Fund, named as a memorial to Stuart (a beloved law teacher and SALT 
treasurer) and Ellen Filler. The $2,200 in funds to pay for a student to work during the 
summer with a social justice organization have come predominantly from the SALT treasury 
( $2,000) and have been supplemented by the Fund. Last year, a decision was made to not 
award a summer stipend, in part to allow the Fund to build and in even greater part to 
reorganize and redefine how to continue with it. In these last months of increasing financial 
pressure for SALT, there has been some initial talk of trying to find ways in which the Fund 
could become more self-sufficient. 
In the meantime, there is an expectation that we will again award another grant this year 
and we are soliciting from our members names of worthy organizations to which we could 
send a summer grant to hire a law student. 
Nominations should be sent to Chris Iijima (iijimac@hawaii.edu) and come with a 
description of the group and its relationship to SALT's commitment to social justice, its need, 
and its ability to supervise. The group should be law-related but the grant is not restricted to 
direct legal service work. 
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SALT Salary Survey: Where 
Have All the Numbers 
Gone? 
Howard A. Glickstein, Touro Law Center 
SALT has been publishing a Salary Survey 
for over a quarter of a century. The Survey 
was undertaken as a means of providing 
information to those contemplating 
entering law teaching; those already in 
teaching; and law school and university 
administrators. There is usually great 
demand for copies of each year's Survey, 
including requests from the press. The 
Survey serves an extremely useful purpose. 
I am disappointed that the number of 
schools cooperating in the Survey has 
declined in recent years. 
For many years, the Section of Legal 
Education, as part of its annual question-
naire, requested salary data. Unlike most 
of the other data collected, the salary data 
was "confidential." Only law school deans 
who consented to abide by the confidenti-
ality restrictions received copies of the 
completed survey. Law schools that did not 
provide their salary data did not receive 
information about the other law schools. 
One of the issues at stake when the Justice 
Department sued the American Bar 
Association, alleging that the accreditation 
process violated the antitrust laws, was the 
collection and dissemination of salary 
data. As part of the consent decree ending 
the litigation, the ABA agreed to discon-
tinue the collection of salary data. The 
Justice Department made clear that 
nothing would prevent a private organiza-
tion from collecting salary data. 
Since the ABA stopped collecting salary 
data, there has been a steady decline in the 
response to our Survey. Some law schools 
claim that, as long as they compiled the 
data for the ABA, they did not mind 
furnishing it to us. (It is difficult to 
believe that some law schools no longer 
maintain faculty salary data.) Some law 
schools might have felt some pressure to 
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release salary data to the ABA. Most feel 
less urgency to respond to a request from 
SALT. 
We have tried to confront the non-
response problem in a number of ways. 
First, we have asked SALT members to put 
pressure on their deans to respond to the 
Salary Survey (a list of non-responding 
schools appears at the end of this column). 
Second, we have asked SALT members at 
non-responding schools to see if they could 
obtain data and furnish it to us. (At one 
non-responding school, the dean was 
outraged when a faculty member provided 
us with salary data that the dean had 
declined to disclose. I assume that the 
dean's face turned red when I informed 
him that the faculty member obtained the 
salary data from the provost of the 
university and had not stolen it from the 
dean's desk drawer.) 
We especially reminded faculty 
members at public institutions, where 
salary data generally is made public, that 
with a little bit of research they probably 
could find the information for us. Finally, 
we have tried to do some internet research 
on our own, with limited success. 
Once again, I urge all SALT members 
to do what they can to encourage their 
schools to furnish us with salary data or to 
take some time to see if they can uncover 
the salary data on their own. The 
reluctance of law schools to disclose salary 
data is just another example of the special 
privileges to which law schools and their 
faculties feel entitled. There are few job 
classifications for which salary data is kept 
confidential. We know the salaries of 
government officials, of judges, of many 
lawyers in major law firms, of athletes, of 
movie stars, and of scores of other profes-
sionals and non-professionals. I may be 
missing something, but if the Mets know 
what the Yankees are paying their players, 
why shouldn't Columbia know what stars 
at NYU get paid, and vice versa? I guess law 
schools and law faculties are just different. 
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Schools that have not responded 
to the SALT salary survey: Committee News 
Alabama George Mason 
American University George 
Arizona Washington 
Barry Georgetown Notre Dame Thomas Jefferson 
Baylor Harvard Pace Tulane 
Boston College Hofstra Pennsylvania UC Berkeley 
Boston University Howard Pepperdine UC Davis 
Brigham Young Illinois Quinnipiac UCIA 
Brooklyn Indiana (Bloomington) Richmond Utah 
Cal Western JAG Roger Williams Vanderbilt 
Case Western Reserve Kansas St. John's Villanova 
Catholic-DC Kentucky Saint Louis Virginia 
Chicago Lewis & Clark St. Mary's Wake Forest 
Chicago-Kent Loyola (Chicago) San Diego Washington and Lee 
Cincinnati Loyola (Los Angeles) San Francisco Washington (St. Louis) 
Columbia Maine Santa Clara Western State 
Cornell McGeorge South Carolina Whittier 
Cumberland (Samford) Miami Southern California Widener 
DePaul Minnesota Southern Methodist William & Mary 
Detroit-Mercy New England Southwestern Willamette 
Duke New York Law Stanford Wisconsin 
Fordham NYU SUNY Buffalo Yale 
Franklin Pierce North Carolina Central Stetson 
Northwestern Temple 
Judicial Nominations: The Hits Just Keep On Coming 
Bob Dinerstein, American University, Washington College of Law 
The good news-bad news story of the Bush Administration's judicial nominations goes on, 
and SALT continues to play both a public and behind-the-scenes role in bringing to the 
attention of key actors the extremist views of so many of these nominees. 
First, the good news, such as it is. As of this writing (late July), Senate Democrats 
continue to filibuster successfully against two of the Administration's problematic nomi-
nees: Miguel Estrada, a nominee for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, 
and Justice Priscilla Owen, a nominee for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The 
Senate has rejected cloture on Estrada five times (most recently on May 6, 2003) and on 
Owen once (on May 1, 2003). As you know from previous reports in the Equalizer, SALT, both 
organizationally and through individual members, has actively opposed both nominees. 
Another bit of good news is what did not happen this summer-the retirement of any 
current Supreme Court Justice. While it is not completely out of the question for a Justice to 
retire after the end of the term, the speculation that one or possibly two Justices would 
announce their retirements by June 30 turned out to be inaccurate. In light of the nature of 
its nominees to the district and circuit courts, there is little reason to think that the Bush 
Administration would have appointed someone within the mainstream to the vacant slot(s). 
Because of the relationship between Supreme Court nominations and presidential electoral 
Judicial continued on page 26 
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Committee News 
SALT Awards Dinner Date 
Set; Award Nominees 
Sought 
Bob Dinerstein, American University, 
Washington College of Law 
This year's SALT Annual Awards Dinner will 
take place in conjunction with the AALS 
annual meeting in Atlanta on Monday 
evening, January 5 (reception starts at 7:00 
p.m.; dinner starts at 7:30p.m.). 
Because of the way the calendar falls 
this year, the AALS schedule is somewhat 
different from that of recent years. Instead 
of going from Thursday to Sunday, the 
conference goes from Saturday to Tuesday. 
After polling the Board, the Committee 
concluded that having the dinner on 
Monday evening, the traditional point in 
the conference if not the traditional day of 
the week, presented the fewest conflicts for 
attendance at the dinner. Our informal 
survey of law schools revealed that most 
schools will not be starting classes on that 
Monday, so conflict with external sched-
ules should be minimized. As of this 
writing, we have not yet identified a 
location for the dinner, but we have a lead 
on a place to hold the event. 
The Committee is responsible for 
recommending to the Board of Directors 
recipients for two important awards. The 
SALT Teaching Award is an annual award 
given for special contributions to the 
teaching mission of the legal academy. 
Last year's winners were long-time SALT 
stalwarts Chuck Lawrence and Mari 
Matsuda of Georgetown University Law 
Center. Prior recent winners have included 
Sylvia Law, Marjorie Schultz, Tony 
Amsterdam, Jim Jones, Haywood Burns, 
BarbaraAldave and Trina Grillo. The Award 
has been given every year since 1976 (the 
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first winner was David Cavers) and 
twice has gone to an institution 
(CUNY Law School and University of 
Wisconsin Law School) rather than to 
an individual. 
The second award is the SALT Human 
Rights Award. This award, which is not 
necessarily given every year, recognizes the 
extraordinary work of an individual or 
organization in advancing the principles 
of equality and equal access to legal 
education, the legal profession and legal 
services. This award was created in 1997 
after the death of Shanara Gilbert, who 
died in South Africa (in the same bus 
accident as Haywood Bums) while forging 
connections between clinical legal 
education and human rights advocacy in 
that country. Last year, the award went to 
anti-death penalty advocates Stephen 
Bright, Director of the Southern Center for 
Human Rights, and Bryan Stevenson, 
Executive Director of the Equal Justice 
Initiative of Alabama. Previous recipients 
of the award have been Dr. Jesse Stone.Jr., 
Congressman Barney Frank and Ibrahim 
Gass am a. 
In recent years, an important part of 
the dinner (and the fund-raising necessary 
to defray its costs while keeping the cost to 
attendees down) has been the program and 
the advertisements that law schools, 
individual or groups of law faculty, and 
others have taken out in support of SALT or 
the award winners. We would like to make 
a special effort this year to increase the 
number of advertisements, and we 
encourage you and your law schools to 
participate. And remember, you and your 
law school can show your support for our 
awardees even if they are not from your 
own institution. You will be receiving 
more information on the listserv regarding 
how to purchase an advertisement, the 
cost, and other logistics. 
Nominations-which should be 
received by Friday, September 26, 2003-for 
either or both awards should be submitted 
to either of the Committee's Co-Chairs, 
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who can be reached as follows: 
Margalynne Armstrong, 
Associate Professor 
Santa Clara University School of Law 
500 El Camino Real 
Santa Clara, CA 95053 
(408) 554-4778 (o) 
(408) 554-4426 (fax) 
marmstrong@scu.edu 
Robert Dinerstein 
Professor and Associate Dean 
for Academic Affairs 
American University, 
Washington College of Law 
4801 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20016 
(202) 274-4141 (o) 
(202) 274-4015 (fax) 
rdiners@wcl.american.edu 
While not a formal part of the 
nomination process, a letter or e-mail in 
support of the nominee would assist the 
Committee in making its recommenda-
tions to the Board. Thanks for your help. 
Judicial: 
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politics, even if there is a vacancy on the 
Court one year from now it is not at all 
clear that the Administration would be 
able to fill the slot prior to the election. So, 
at least for now, the Court may not be any 
worse for the foreseeable future. It is a 
measure of our current political predica-
ment that retention of a Court as conserva-
tive as this one ( Grutter, Lawrence, and 
Hibbs notwithstanding) is seen as a 
positive development. 
A final bit of good news is that, thus 
far, Republican efforts to change the rules 
on filibustering nominations and other 
nomination procedures have been 
unsuccessful. Again, the irony of people in 
favor of civil rights being thankful for the 
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filibuster is quite striking. 
to the bad news. One Bush 
nominee to the federal bench is worse than 
the next, and despite the efforts of 
numerous organizations and individuals, 
a number of very conservative activists, 
with strong anti-progressive records, have 
been confirmed for judgeships. Since our 
last report, the Senate has confirmed such 
troubling nominees as Deborah Cook and 
Jeffrey Sutton (both for the Sixth Circuit) 
and John Roberts (for the D.C. Circuit). 
The Senate Judiciary Committee has voted 
to send to the Senate floor Judge Carolyn 
Kuhl (for the Ninth Circuit) and Alabama 
Attorney General William Pryor (for the 
Eleventh Circuit; see below). The President 
also has continued to nominate (or 
indicated his intention to do so) a number 
of extremely conservative individuals to 
important judgeships, including Deputy 
Secretary of Health and Human Services 
Claude Allen (Fourth Circuit), and, for the 
D.C. Circuit, Justice Janice Rogers Brown of 
the California Supreme Court (where, 
among other things, she wrote the opinion 
upholding a broad interpretation of 
California's anti-affirmative action 
Proposition 209) and Brett Kavanaugh (a 
key assistant to Independent Counsel 
Kenneth Starr, and Assistant White House 
counsel, with a major role in advocating 
the Bush judicial nominations). 
On July 23, the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, on a straight party-line 10-9 
vote, voted to send William Pryor's 
nomination to the Senate floor. Pryor may 
be the most extreme Bush judicial 
nominee thus far. Despite allegations from 
a staff member that the Republican 
Attorneys General Association, which Pryor 
helped to form, arranged for sitting state 
attorneys-general to solicit corporate 
executives in their states for campaign 
contributions (a fact that Pryor denied at 
his confirmation hearing), the Judiciary 
Committee saw fit to report out the 
nomination. 
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The SALT-Board approved a letter of 
opposition to Pryor's nomination, 
which was delivered to the Senate 
Judiciary Committee before its consider-
ation of the Pryor nomination. (See the 
letteron page 28.) In addition, wee-
mailed SALT members from law schools in 
Pennsylvania to ask them to contact 
Senator Arlen Spector (R-PA), amemberof 
the Judiciary Committee reported to be "on 
the fence" regarding the nomination, to 
express their opposition to Pryor's nomina-
"[D ]j espite the efforts 
of numerous 
organizations and 
individuals, a number 
of very conseroative 
activists, with strong 
anti-progressive 
records, have been 
confirmed for 
judgeships. " 
ti on. A number of SALT members sent such 
messages of opposition to Senator Spector. 
While he voted to report out the nomina-
tion, Spector indicated that he had not yet 
decided how he would vote if the nomina-
tion comes to a vote on the Senate floor. 
There are strong indications that the 
Democrats will filibuster the Pryor 
nomination if it is brought up for a vote, 
unless they conclude that there are enough 
Republican defectors to yield victory on a 
straight up-and-down vote. 
[Editor's note: After this article was 
submitted for publication, the author sent 
the following e-mail to the SALT Board on 
July 31, 2003: "The Senate failed to 
override a filibuster today on the nomina-
tion of William Pryor. The vote was 53-47 
for Pryor (Democrats Nelson from 




only Democrats to vote for him), 7 votes 
short of the 60 needed for cloture. I believe 
this means that Spector voted for the 
nomination-so much for his voting for 
Pryor in committee but not being 
committed to voting for him on the floor. 
The Senate also has failed to invoke 
cloture for a seventh time for the Estrada 
nomination (5 votes short) and for the 
third time for the Owen nomination. The 
Republicans plan to bring up Carolyn 
Kuhl (9th Circuit) for a floor vote 
tomorrow. Then, mercifully, they are on 
recess until Labor Day."] 
Thanks to our friends at the Alliance 
for Justice's Independent Judiciary Project 
(and the very helpful e-mails from Kendra-
Sue Derby, Director of Field Operations for 
the Alliance), the SALT Judicial Nomina-
tions Committee is able to monitor these 
nominations closely. It is particularly 
important that SALT weigh in against 
nominations where the nominee has taken 
a stance inimical to legal, social and 
political issues close to SALT's heart (and 
about which SALT members have special 
expertise). We easily could justify opposing 
virtually every one of the Bush 
Administration's nominees, but limited 
time (and a desire to focus on the most 
problematic nominees) counsels against 
such a scatter-shot approach. The Commit-
tee welcomes your input on judicial 
nominees and any assistance, including 
drafting of positions in opposition to some 
or all of a nominee's views, that you are in 
a position to provide. In addition, as 
Senators tend to be more responsive to their 
constituents (even law professors!) than 
other individuals or groups, we urge you to 
respond to our requests to contact your 
Senators when a particular nominee or 




Following is the text of a letter sent 
on behalf of the SALT Board by Co-
Presidents Michael Rooke-Ley and 
Paula Johnson to the Senate judiciary 
Committee on July 16, 2003. 
Dear Senators Hatch and Leahy: 
On behalf of the Society of American 
Law Teachers ("SALT"), the largest 
organization of law professors in the 
United States, representing over 800 law 
professors from over 150 law schools, we 
write to express our strong opposition to 
the nomination of William H. Pryor, Jr., to 
a seat on the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit. 
In our judgment, Attorney General 
Pryor is an extreme advocate of a "turn-
back-the clock" form of federalism that 
threatens to undermine the basic constitu-
tional rights of, among others, children, 
women, people with disabilities, gays and 
lesbians, and senior citizens. Through the 
positions he has taken in various cases, 
both in representing the State of Alabama 
as a party and as an amicus curiae, he 
has shown insensitivity to such basic 
constitutional rights as the right to 
privacy, the separation of church and state, 
the Commerce Clause, and the Eighth 
Amendment. He also has expressed 
hostility to such important congressional 
enactments as the Clean Water Act, the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act, Title 
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the 
Violence Against Women Act. When linked 
to his well-documented intemperateness, 
his positions belie his claim that, if 
confirmed, he will simply follow the 
applicable law, ignoring the values he 
obviously holds dear. 
Attorney General Pryor has made active 
use of the amicus curiae brief to 
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propagate his extreme positions. He 
filed a brief in the recent Supreme 
Court case of Lawrence v. Texas, 2003 
U.S. Lexis 5013 June 23, 2003), which 
struck down Texas's sodomy statute. In 
the brief, he argued that reversal of the 
lower-court decision (which the Supreme 
Court in fact did) would entail protection 
for "prostitution, adultery, necrophilia, 
bestiality, possession of child pornography 
and even incest and pedophilia .. .. " He 
filed the lone state amicus curiae brief to 
argue for a weakening of the Clean Water 
Act in Solid Waste Agency of Northern 
Cook County v. United States Corps of 
Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001). He filed a 
brief unsuccessfully opposing recognition 
of the Family and Medical Leave Act as a 
valid exercise of congressional power under 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in 
the recent case of Nevada Dep 't of 
Human Resources v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 
1972 ( 2003). He also filed a brief inAtkins 
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), against 
recognition of mental retardation as a 
disqualifying condition for application of 
the death penalty under the Eighth 
Amendment. Once again, the Supreme 
Court ruled against the position he 
advocated. 
Mr. Pryor has sought to participate in 
various challenges to the constitutionality 
of Title II of the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act ("ADA"), which proscribes 
discrimination on the basis of disability in 
state and local programs. He has filed 
amicus curiae briefs in two cases 
challenging the constitutionality of Title 
II, Yeskey v. Pennsylvania, 524 U.S. 206 
(1998) (where the Court rejected his view), 
and Medical Bd of California Hasan, 
No. 02-479, cert. dismissed, 173 S. Ct. 
1779 (2003). The issue of Title II's 
continuing validity remains very alive as 
the Supreme Court has granted certiorari 
in another Title II case to be heard next 
term, Tennesseev. Lane, No. 02-1667, 
cert. granted, 2003 U.S. Lexis4818 (June 
23, 2003). 
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In cases where the Court has adopted 
the result Attorney General Pryor's amicus 
curiae briefs have sought, his positions 
suggest his hostility to key pieces of federal 
legislation. For example, he filed the only 
amicus curiae brief on behalf of a state 
against the constitutionality of the 
Violence Against Women Act in United 
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
He also filed a brief in opposition to the 
constitutionality of the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act, Kimel v. 
Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 
(2000). 
Attorney General Pryor has called Roe 
v. Wade "the worst abomination of 
constitutional law in our history." He has 
supported the judicial display of the Ten 
Commandments in the courtroom and the 
invocation of Christian prayers before the 
impaneling of juries. He has defended 
Alabama's practice of tying inmates to 
hitching posts for long periods of time, a 
practice the Supreme Court called 
"degrading and dangerous" and 
"obvious[ly] cruel." Hopev. Pelzer, 122 S. 
Ct. 2508 (2002). He has praised the 
extremist decision of Westside Mothers v. 
Haveman, 133 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Mich. 
2001), rev 'din relevant part, 289 F. 3 d 
852 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 154 L. Ed. 2d 
516 (2002), a case where the district court 
would have held that congressional 
legislation passed pursuant to the 
Spending Power is not the "supreme law of 
the land" for purposes of the Supremacy 
Clause. He argued unsuccessfully for 
vacating a consent decree (entered into by 
his predecessor) in a case concerning the 
care and custody of foster children in 
Alabama despite the fact that the state had 
not complied with the decree. R. C v. 
Nachman, 969 F. Supp. 682 (M.D. Ala. 
1997). Apparently unconcerned about 
whether his position would harm vulner-
able children in the state's care, he noted, 
"My job is to make sure that the state of 
Alabama isn't run by federal courts .... My 
job isn't to come here and help children." 
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Attorney General Pryor's litigation 
positions have had consequences far 
beyond his desire to protect Alabama's 
interests as he sees them. In Board of 
Trustees of the University of Alabama v. 
Garrett, 531 U.S.356 (2001), he success-
fully argued that Title I of the ADA was not 
a constitutional exercise of Congress's 
power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and thus could not override 
the state's Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity from damage actions brought by 
individuals. This decision has significantly 
hamstrung the reach and effectiveness of 
the ADA. On remand for consideration of 
whether plaintiffs could pursue a claim 
under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act, the Attorney General argued that the 
state had not knowingly waived its 
Eleventh Amendment immunity in 
accepting federal funds, and hence could 
not be sued under this statute either, a 
position that the district court accepted. 
(The case is once again on appeal.) The 
inescapable conclusion is that Attorney 
General Pryor believes the federal govern-
Finally ... A Textbook on 
Social Justice 
SALT Co-President Michael Rooke-Ley, 
Seattle University School of Law (visiting 
2003-04) 
Given the years-dare I say decades-of talk 
and more talk among SALT members at 
our conferences and workshops about the 
need for "social justice" materials, about 
course development, about curricular 
reform, about providing something we 
can really work with ... well, it's time for 
some celebration and recognition. 
Within the conventional, brown, hard 
covers of Thomson West, you will find the 
extraordinary work of SALT Board member 
Mamie Mahoney (Miami),John Calmore 
(North Carolina), and former SALT Co-
President Stephanie Wildman (Santa 
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ment has virtually no role to play in 
enforcement of well-established 
principles of non-discrimination on the 
basis of disability. 
The Attorney General's zealotry is not 
limited to trenching upon the rights of 
people with disabilities. He was responsible 
for litigating Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 
U.S. 275 (2001), which limited the relief 
available to plaintiffs suing under Title VI 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Sandoval's 
conclusion that the Title VI regulations 
cannot address disparate impact is a major 
blow to civil rights enforcement. 
As law professors, we would be the last 
people to criticize lawyers for zealous 
advocacy of their clients' causes, even if we 
disagreed with those clients' positions. But 
Attorney General Pryor's views go well 
beyond those necessary to represent his 
client zealously. He has sought out, and 
staked out, a position as the prime 
defender of an extraordinarily limited view 
of federal power that would have the effect 
of undoing legal developments that date 
not only from the New Deal but from the 
Clara), entitled "Cases and Materials on 
Social]ustice: Professionals, Communi-
ties, and Law." 
As the authors observe, "[  m] embers of 
the legal academy-in classrooms and 
clinics-have sought to teach about social 
justice in law schools because students 
want to know how they can work with the 
people who most need them." With this 
comprehensive and wide-ranging 1100-
page volume, we have been given just the 
tool we need to teach and inspire a new 
generation of lawyers to work with 
marginalized, subordinated and 
underrepresented clients and causes. 
Nearly 150 contributors-including 
many of you- have brought varied 
experiences and perspectives from practice, 
the academy and the bench. Reading so 




time of Reconstruction. His views should 
be particularly troubling for members of 
Congress who have played key roles in 
sponsoring the various pieces of legislation 
he has opposed with such vehemence. Mr. 
Pryor is entitled to his views, and the 
people of Alabama, if they choose to do so, 
are entitled to re-elect him to public office. 
But the Senate Judiciary Committee 
should exercise its advise and consent 
power to keep those views from being 
foisted on litigants in the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
and on the broader body politic. We urge 
the Committee in the strongest possible 
terms to reject this nomination. 
Sincerely, 
Michael Rooke-Ley 
Paula C. Johnson 
Co-Presidents 
Society of American Law Teachers 
authors could be daunting, confusing and 
frustrating were it not for the careful and 
thoughtful commentaries ("Notes and 
Questions"), which so effectively tie the 
materials together. 
Here is a casebook that is already being 
used enthusiastically for large first-year 
courses on law, values and social justice; 
for small, upper-division electives on 
public interest lawyering; or simply as an 
invaluable resource for the rest of us who 
may wish to cherry-pick pieces and 
chapters for all that we do. 
AskStephanie (swildman@scu.edu), 
Mamie (mmahoney@law.miami.edu), or 
John (jcalmore@email.unc.edu) to send 
you their 14-page Table of Contents. It's 
quite a tour de force. You'll be impressed. 
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Rooke-Ley Rallies Political 
Activists 
The following excerpts are from a speech 
that SALT Co-President Michael Rooke-
Ley gave to a gathering of 400 political 
activists in Eugene, Oregon on July 20, 
2003. 
The folks who have come together tonight 
are dedicated activists, who have worked for 
so many years to bring out the best in 
America. These are patriots who know the 
difference between community-building 
and empire-building. 
These days, in our state capitol as well 
as our nation's capitol, our social priorities 
have been turned upside down. While 
precious lives are lost and billions are spent 
for a war we don't want, Oregonians in 
need have become increasingly desperate in 
the face of drastic social service cutbacks; 
our system of justice has been forced to 
close one door after another; and our kids' 
school year-already the shortest in the 
nation-is shortened even further. Over-
worked teachers face classes that are much 
too large; programs are being cut right and 
left; my own kids don't have textbooks to 
take home anymore .... 
Here in Oregon and across America, we 
need jobs. We don't need NAFTA or the 
WfO-we need industry here and trade 
treaties abroad which respect workers' 
rights, human rights and the environ-
ment. . .. 
We need a new direction. We need 
candidates for public office who are 
willing to speak out on these issues. 
While we are deeply gratified by two 
recent Supreme Court decisions regarding 
affirmative action and regarding the right 
of privacy for the gay and lesbian commu-
nities, we know that the Bush Administra-
tion and its conservative base are gearing 
up to avenge those losses through their 
nominees to the federal bench. These are 
SALT Equalizer 
lifetime appointments, so the time to 
fight these battles is now .... We need 
judges who believe in the principles of 
justice and equality, who respect choice, 
and who reflect the diversity of 
America .... 
On the international front, the 
progressive community recognizes that the 
Bush Administration is simply "out of 
control." Time after time, this Administra-
"Time after time, [the 
Bush j administration 
has displayed an 
arrogance, an 
adolescent pugnacity, 
that is not just 
embarrassing, but 
truly damaging on a 
global scale. With its 
Wild West rhetoric and 
blatant disinterest in 
nurturing a 
community of 
nations, it has 
fostered a level of 
resentment and 
hatred for America 
unparalleled in our 
lifetime. In the words 
of our home-made 
protest signs, this 
'mad cowboy disease 
could kill us all. "' 
ti on has displayed an arrogance, an 
adolescent pugnacity, that is not just 
embarrassing, but truly damaging on a 
global scale. With its Wild West rhetoric 
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and blatant disinterest in nurturing a 
community of nations, it has fostered a 
level of resentment and hatred for America 
unparalleled in our lifetime. In the words 
of our home-made protest signs, this "mad 
cowboy disease could kill us all." 
People all over the world have suffered 
at the hands of this Administration. Let us 
count the ways: 
•rejection of the Kyoto Accords; 
•absence from the Durban Conference 
on Human Rights; 
•rejection of the Biological and 
Chemical Weapons Convention; 
•unilateral termination of the ABM 
Treatywith Russia; 
•active opposition to the creation of 
the International Criminal Court; 
•promulgation of a "pre-emption" 
doctrine, justifying military intervention 
whenever we wish and setting a horrifying 
precedent for rogue nations of the world; 
•the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq, 
sold on the basis of exaggerations and 
fabrications and without U.N. authoriza-
tion; and now 
•the awarding of massive re-building 
contracts to the likes of Bechtel and 
Halliburton. 
This is an outrage-a scandal of 
enormous proportions . ... And, yes, we 
need a new direction ... . 
Finally, let's remind ourselves that this 
is a community which has gone on record 
in opposition to the PATRIOT Act, thanks 
to the work of so many of you seated here 
tonight. Our work must continue, 
spreading the word to communities across 
the nation about the insanity of sacrific-
ing our civil liberties in the name of 
security. 
There is, I'm afraid, no rest for the 
weary. The political times have never been 
worse, the stakes have never been higher. 
We must meet the challenge and reclaim 




Norman Dorsen Fellowship 
PLEDGE FORM 
Yes! I want to support the Nonnan Dorsen Fellowship. Over the next five years I promise to make the tax deductible contributions at 
the following level: 
--Distinguished Contributor ($1,500 total, or $300 a year) 
--Honored Contributor ($1,000 total, or $200 a year) 
--Sustaining Contributor ($500 total or $100 a year) 
--Contribution (other) $ ____ per year 
Or: 




Make your check payable to: SALT, designated to the Dorsen Fund on the notation line, and mail to: Sylvia A. Law, NYU Law School, 40 
Washington Sq. So., New York, N.Y. 10012. 
The contribution is tax deductible. 
Nonnan Dorsen Fellowship Committee: David Chambers, Howard Glickstein, Phoebe Haddon, Sylvia A. Law, Charles R. Lawrence, Avi Soifer, 
and Wendy Webster Williams. 
L----------------------------------------~ 
r----------------------------------------1 
Society of American Law Teachers 
Membership Application (or renewal) 
Enroll/renew me as a Regular Member. I enclose $50 ($35 for those earning less than $30,000 per year). 
Enroll/renew me as a Contributing Member. I enclose $100. 
Enroll/renew me as a Sustaining Member. I enclose $300. 
I enclose ($100, $150, $200, or $250) to prepay my dues for ___ years ($50 each year). 
Enroll me as a Lifetime Member. I enclose $750. 
I am contributing $ ___ to the Stuart and Ellen Filler Fund to support public interest internships. 
I am contributing $ as an additional contribution to support SALT's promotion of affirmative action. 
Name School ____________ _ 
Address ___________________ _ E-mail ____________ _ 
-------------------- ZIP Code ___________ _ 
Make checks payable to: Society of American Law Teachers 
Mail to: Professor David F. Chavkin 
Washington College of Law 
American University 
4801 Massachusetts Ave. NW 
Washington, DC 20016 
L----------------------------------------~ 
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